CRB Case Annotations re: Section 31-294c

NOTE: ALL CASES FORMERLY REFERENCED UNDER SEC. 31-297(b) ARE NOW INCLUDED IN SEC. 31-294c.

Claimant appealed dismissal of claim on basis that totality of evidence was insufficient to establish that his mesothelioma was caused by employment. CRB affirmed, rejecting claimant’s contention that commissioner utilized incorrect standard of proof and noting that commissioner retained discretion to deem medical reports unpersuasive, particularly if opinion was derivative of claimant’s narrative. CRB denied respondents’ motion to dismiss, rejecting argument that claimant’s motion to correct was so legally deficient that it failed to toll statutory time limit for filing appeal pursuant to General Statutes § 31-301 (a). Respondents also contended that doctrines of res judicata/collateral estoppel deprived board of jurisdiction to hear appeal in light of prior Supreme Court holding that “estate is not a legal entity capable of advancing a claim for any form of workers’ compensation benefits....“ Estate of Rock v. University of Connecticut, 323 Conn. 26, 28 (2016). CRB was not persuaded, noting that commissioner had correctly determined that evidentiary record did not reflect that claim had been brought by estate, and individual prosecuting claim possessed statutory authority to do so. See also, Rock, § 31-275 (1); § 31-298; § 31-301 Appeal procedure; § 31-301 Factual findings.

Commissioner granted motion to preclude after concluding that respondent employer’s donation to claimant’s GoFundMe page did not satisfy requirements set forth in General Statutes § 31-294c (b). CRB affirmed, noting that witness testimony did not provide adequate basis for reasonable inference that donation constituted payment for twenty six weeks of compensation or, alternatively, that respondents had provided medical care as contemplated by statute. CRB also noted that charitable donations are not included in definition of “compensation” as set forth in General Statutes § 31-275 (4). CRB affirmed commissioner’s denial of motion to correct, noting that respondents’ proposed corrections primarily served to reiterate arguments which had been unavailing at trial. See also, Lefevre, § 31-275 (4); § 31-301 Factual findings.

Claimant filed claim for § 7-433c benefits within one year of when he testified he had been diagnosed for hypertension. Respondents argued that over one year earlier he had been examined repeatedly for elevated blood pressure readings, had discussed possible medication with physician, and physician would have explained reason for repeated examinations. Trial commissioner accepted this version of events and determined pursuant to Ciarlelli v. Hamden, 299 Conn. 265 (2010) claim was untimely. CRB affirmed on appeal. See also, Perry, § 7-433c; § 31-301 Factual findings.

Claimant filed notice of claim, respondents did not file a timely form 43, and claimant sought a Motion to Preclude. Trial commissioner granted motion. Respondents appealed arguing that based on the facts (no lost time or medical bills presented prior to the disclaimer), they were entitled to a “safe harbor” to contest extent of disability consistent with Dubrosky v. Boehringer Ingelheim Corp., 145 Conn. App. 261 (2013), cert. denied, 310 Conn. 935 (2013). CRB rejected this argument. There is no evidence the respondents ever accepted the compensability of the claim either through written documentation or a course of conduct. Case can therefore be distinguished from Dubrosky but is indistinguishable from Dominguez v. New York Sports Club, 6210 CRB-7-17-8 (August 28, 2018), appeal pending, A.C. 42089 (September 12, 2018).

Claimant asserted he was injured at respondents’ premises when a junk car fell on him and testified co-workers transported him to the hospital. Although his form 30C was filed more than one year after date of injury he asserted that circumstances herein were within “medical care exception” and commission had jurisdiction. Respondents denied entirety of narrative. Trial commissioner found claimant credible and determined his claim was timely. CRB affirmed; finding case indistinguishable from Wetmore v. Paul Frosolone and Seasonal Services of Connecticut, L.L.C., 6176 CRB-5-17-2 (February 7, 2018). See also, DeJesus, § 31-275 (9); § 31-275 (10); § 31-298; § 31-301 Factual findings; § 31-301-4; § 31-355.

CRB reversed trier’s dismissal that the claim was not filed timely. Claimant should be given the opportunity to present an occupational disease claim where the facts alleged in the form 30C present a colorable claim. See also, Banks, 31-301 Appeal Procedure; 31-301-9 Additional Evidence.

Claimant filed claim for workplace injury and respondents did not file timely disclaimer. Respondents opposed Motion to Preclude arguing claimant had not lost time from injury or submitted medical bills within 28 days of notice of claim; hence pursuant to Dubrosky v. Boehringer Ingelheim Corp., 145 Conn. App. 261 (2013), cert. denied, 310 Conn. 935 (2013) they had “safe harbor” rights to contest extent of claimant’s disability. Trial commissioner accepted argument and claimant appealed. CRB reversed decision. CRB declined to extend “safe harbor” to cases where, unlikeDubrosky, respondents never documented acceptance of the claim. Our precedent has been when a respondent files an untimely disclaimer and fails to accept compensability of the injury we have affirmed a finding that they are fully precluded from defending the claim. Actual disclaimer filed by respondents here challenged causation; not extent of disability.

Claimant filed a motion to preclude as respondents failed to disclaim claim or commence payments within twenty-eight days of receiving notice. Trial commissioner granted preclusion and directed additional hearing for claimant to present medical evidence supportive of awarding benefits. Respondents’ appealed arguing claimant should present prima facia claim prior to being granted preclusion. CRB affirmed decision. Donahue v. Veridiem, Inc., 291 Conn. 537 (2009) and Harpaz v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 286 Conn. 102 (2008) bifurcate this process where preclusion is determined on pleadings and claimant then left to their proof. Trial commissioner followed precedent in Geraldino v. Oxford Academy of Hair Design, 5968 CRB-5-14-10 (January 20, 2016). This appeal, where jurisdiction to grant preclusion was not challenged and relief sought was redundant with orders already issued by the trial commissioner, was an unnecessary interlocutory appeal. See Quinones v. RW Thompson Company, Inc., 5792 CRB-1-12-10 (January 16, 2014). See also, Cariello, § 31-301 Appeal procedure.

Claimant asserted back & elbow problems were result of ergonomically improper work station. Claimant did not file a timely Form 30C and respondents moved to dismiss. On appeal, CRB found claimant had treated via group health policy and had never advised respondent of likelihood of claim; case indistinguishable from Izikson v. Protein Sciences Corp.,156 Conn. App. 700 (2015). Claimant’s actions did not put respondent on notice a claim would be imminent so as to trigger the “medical care exception”; unlike Spencer v. Manhattan Bagel Company, 5419 CRB-8-09-1 (January 22, 2010). See also, Smith-Glasper, § 31-275 (1); § 31-301 Factual findings.

Claimant sustained severed finger while operating lawn mower and putative employer drove him to hospital and later retrieved severed digit. Claimant did not file timely notice of claim but argued that respondent “furnished medical care” and this satisfied notice exception. Trial commissioner agreed & CRB affirmed on appeal; case distinguished from Kulis v. Moll, 172 Conn. 104 (1976) as CRB found trial commissioner applied test in Spencer v. Manhattan Bagel Company, 5419 CRB-8-09-1 (January 22, 2010). See also, Wetmore, § 31-294d; § 31-301 Factual findings; § 31-355(b).

Claimant injured and served notice of claim on “Mimi Dragone, LLC.” Over one year later it was determined claimant’s actual relationship was with Thomas Dragone or Dragone & Sons, L.L.C. Thomas Dragone moved to dismiss claim for untimely filing of notice and trial commissioner granted motion, finding claimant failed to put putative employer on notice within one year statutory claim period. Claimant appealed arguing that notice to the commission and a hearing within one year of the accident satisfied jurisdictional requirements. CRB rejected argument, citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) and § 1-2z C.G.S.; it would create an absurd result if serving a unrelated party with a similar name conferred jurisdiction and Commission not obligated to rectify discrepancy. Obligation is on claimant to initiate claim properly. Claimant also argued that this was a “misnomer case” similar to Burch v. A-1 Home Services, 5905 CRB-3-13-12 (December 18, 2014) and employer had actual knowledge a claim was pending. CRB rejected this argument, obligation was on claimant to prove respondent had actual or constructive notice of a pending claim and commissioner’s determination this did not occur was consistent with the record.

Claimant asserted back injury at work and filed a Form 30C with date she later determined was in error by two days. Respondents made aware of date discrepancy at a deposition held within one year of date of injury. Respondents sought to dismiss claim asserting invalid notice. Trial Commissioner awarded benefits to claimant. Respondents appealed alleging inaccurate date voided jurisdiction. CRB affirmed award, facts and law herein indistinguishable from Staurovsky v. Milford, 5884 CRB-4-13-10 (November 25, 2014) and Kingston v. Seymour, 5789 CRB-5-12-10 (September 10, 2013) where we found minor date discrepancies did not make claim invalid. See also, Watley, § 31-301 Factual findings.

Claimant asserted lung injury from work at body shop, where he was asked to stop working. After a Motion to Preclude was granted he presented evidence as to disability and commissioner ordered a commissioner’s examination. Commissioner then denied claim for temporary or partial benefits. Claimant appealed, arguing in part trial commissioner should not have ordered a commissioner’s examination, asserting he had a prima facia case. CRB affirmed re; right to order a commissioner’s examination, citing Donahue v. Veridiem, Inc., 291 Conn. 537 (2009). However, CRB determined trial commissioner’s statements at hearing could have prejudiced claimant, and remanded for further proceedings. See also, Wilson, § 31-275(1); § 31-275(16); § 31-294f; § 31-298.

Claimant sustained fall down injury at work and just prior to one year deadline filed a Form 30C seeking benefits. Injuries she listed did not include her neck, although she had just had disc surgery. Respondents’ disclaimer was more than 28 days after notice and contested extent of her injuries. Claimant filed a Motion to Preclude seeking preclusion of defense to neck injury. Trial commissioner denied motion and CRB affirmed. Respondents’ actions in this case similar to Grzeszczyk v. Stanley Works, 5975 CRB-6-14-12 (December 9, 2015) and Shymidt v. Eagle Concrete, LLC, 6018 CRB-7-15-6 (May 4, 2016). Commissioner did not find claimant’s narrative of putting respondent on notice verbally regarding seeking benefits for neck surgery credible and respondent therefore only obligated to disclaim the injuries listed in the Form 30C.

Claimant filed claim for injury at work and respondents failed to file disclaimer or voluntary agreement within one year. Respondents then accepted incident with voluntary agreement but after dispute as to extent of injury claimant filed Motion to Preclude. Trial commissioner granted preclusion citing noncompliance with standards in Harpaz v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 286 Conn. 102 (2008) and Donahue v. Veridiem, Inc., 291 Conn. 537 (2009). CRB majority upheld decision, finding respondents’ reliance on Dubrosky v. Boehringer Ingelheim Corp., 145 Conn. App. 261 (2013) unwarranted. Unlike Pagan v. Carey Wiping Materials, Inc., 5829 CRB-6-13-14 (March 28, 2014) respondents did not clearly accept the claim within one year of the notice and facts did not refute trial commissioner’s conclusion. Domeracki v. Dan Perkins Chevrolet, 5727 CRB-4-12-1 (May 1, 2013) on point. CRB remanded on issue of relief as it could not be ordered without an evidentiary hearing. Dissent, Chairman Mastropietro. Facts in this case indicate claimant acknowledged respondent had accepted case by accepting voluntary agreement and monetary consideration prior to filing motion to preclude. Purpose of preclusion statute as outlined in Menzies v. Fisher, 165 Conn. 338 (1973) not present herein. Precedent in Adzima v. UAC/Norden Div., 177 Conn. 107 (1979) and Dubrosky suggests respondents should be able to contest extent of disability in such claims.

Claimant appealed from denial of a Motion to Preclude. Respondents filed a Form 43 more than 28 days after claimant’s Form 30C but less than one year thereafter and trial commissioner found that although disclaimer was not “timely and proper” facts did not warrant preclusion as claimant did not prove any lost time or need for medical treatment subsequent to the injury. CRB affirmed. Case indistinguishable from Grzeszczyk v. Stanley Works, 5975 CRB-6-14-12 (December 9, 2015); respondents clearly within the one year “safe harbor” at time they filed a disclaimer. Despite claimant’s arguments sole deficiency with disclaimer was timeliness.

Claimant filed notices for two injuries sustained the same day; then later filed a Motion to Preclude for his shoulder injury, asserting the Form 43 was untimely. Trial commissioner found claimant had received medical treatment and indemnity payments from respondent prior to claimant filing notice and that respondent�s Form 43 within the one year safe harbor under this scenario. On appeal, CRB affirmed commissioner’s decision. Case indistinguishable from Grzeszczyk v. Stanley Works, 5975 CRB-6-14-12 (December 9, 2015); where CRB found respondents had satisfied “safe harbor” standards from preclusion.

Claimant was dependent widow of decedent who had filed a timely occupational disease claim. Respondents argued claimant’s bid for § 31-306 benefits was jurisdictionally invalid due to untimely filing; and trial commissioner accepted that position and dismissed claim. On appeal, CRB reversed the dismissal and reinstated claim. Supreme Court decision in McCullough v. Swan Engraving, Inc., 320 Conn. 299 (2016) ruled that the legal interpretation of § 31-294c C.G.S. trial commissioner relied on in this case was in error. As McCullough ruled claims such as the claimant’s in this case were not subject to statutory filing deadlines, CRB was obligated to apply precedent and reinstate claim. See also, Quinn, § 31-306.

Claimant, who had a Motion to Preclude granted, obtained an award for various body parts for which she asserted she had sustained injuries at work. Respondents appealed award for body parts where trial commissioner had ordered additional hearings. Claimant argued respondents barred from appealing an award after preclusion had been granted. CRB found respondent had the right to appeal any claim of legal error to an appellate tribunal, citing Castro v. Viera, 207 Conn. 420 (1988) and Wikander v. Asbury Automotive Group/David McDavid Acura, 137 Conn. App. 665 (2012). Chairman issued concurring opinion reiterating the due process right for parties to take appeals. CRB remanded matters regarding open issues to trial commissioner to clarify rationale for relief. See also, Geraldino, § 31-301 Appeal procedure; § 31-301 Factual findings.

Self-represented claimant, who appeared both individually and as president of respondent employer, appealed findings relative to compensability and apportionment of medical and indemnity expenses for series of knee injuries commencing March 1987. CRB vacated findings regarding apportionment and compensability of right knee injury on basis that findings went beyond scope of inquiry as identified by trier. CRB reversed and remanded findings attributing need for surgery to left knee injury of January 2012 as findings were inconsistent with medical evidence in record. CRB rejected claim that trier failed to properly advise claimant regarding inherent conflict of interest arising from claimant’s decision to appear as both claimant and employer’s representative, noting that provisions of neither § 31-278 C.G.S. nor § 31-298 C.G.S. impose upon trial Commissioner an obligation to advise self represented claimant. CRB did find problematic circumstances surrounding claimant’s withdrawal of claim for March 1, 1987 injury and remanded for additional findings relative to whether medical care furnished to claimant following March 1987 injury sufficed to bring claimant within �exceptions� to § 31-294c C.G.S. CRB also found denial of proposed corrections erroneous insofar as denial was inconsistent with CRB analysis. See also, Raphael, § 31-275(1), § 31-278, § 31-298, § 31-301. Factual Findings.

Claimant claimed injury at work. She did not lose time from work and received treatment day after date of injury, and filed Form 30C months later. Respondents filed Form 43 more than 28 days later contesting treatment and proffered voluntary agreements accepting compensability. Claimant argued her Motion to Preclude should have been granted by trial commissioner. CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s denial. Record indicated that respondents had met obligations necessary to preserve “safe harbor” status to contest extent of claimant’s disability. Evidence on record did not support claimant’s contention that failure to provide benefits after filing of Form 30C caused “safe harbor” to lapse. CRB found facts congruent with Dubrosky v. Boehringer Ingelheim Corporation, 145 Conn. App. 261 (2013), Williams v. Brightview Nursing & Retirement, 5854 CRB-6-13-6 (June 12, 2014) and Negron v. CVS Caremark Corporation, 5870 CRB-4-13-8 (July 17, 2014), appeal pending, A.C. 37062.

Claimant appealed denial of Motion to Preclude by trial commissioner who conducted additional formal hearings after trier who had presided over initial formal hearing passed away. Claimant challenged second trial commissioner’s authority to reopen formal hearing and also claimed as error trier’s denial of Motion to Preclude given that respondents never filed Form 43 or voluntary agreement. CRB affirmed, holding that Supreme Court’s directive in Stevens v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 29 Conn. App. 378 (1992), and provisions of §§ 31-278, 31-282 and 31-298 C.G.S. afforded trier ample discretion to reopen formal hearing and take additional evidence. CRB also found that because evidentiary record indicated claimant had been paid medical and indemnity benefits following date of injury continuing until Form 36 was approved, trier could have reasonably inferred that respondents never contested claim and were under no obligation to file Form 43. CRB rejected claimant’s contention that respondents’ failure to file voluntary agreement provided basis for preclusion, noting that provisions of § 31-294c(b) C.G.S. do not refer to voluntary agreements and provisions of § 31-296 C.G.S. and Admin. Reg. 31-296-1 C.G.S. identify penalty for non-compliance as sanctions per § 31-288 C.G.S. See also, Quinones, § 31-278; § 31-296; § 31-298.

Trial commissioner granted Motion to Preclude after concluding claimant’s delivery of Form 30C to executive assistant to chief of fire fighters’ association constituted adequate notice to municipality that claimant, a fire fighter and former fire chief, was claiming § 7-433c C.G.S. benefits. Respondent appealed on basis that executive assistant was employed by fire fighters’ association and record was devoid of evidence that she was agent of municipality and/or authorized to accept service of notices of claim. CRB affirmed, noting record contained testimony from claimant that when he was fire chief, he would give notices of claim to his executive assistant for presentation to town. Assistant treasurer for municipality also testified that fire chief’s executive assistant’s duties included delivery of fire fighters’ notices of claim to assistant treasurer for filing with workers’ compensation insurer. See also, Bedard, § 7-314a, § 31-301 Factual Findings, § 31-321.

Claimant argued that respondent’s disclaimer conceded compensability of her injuries and trial commissioner erred in dismissing her claim. CRB reviewed disclaimer and record and found that as respondents clearly contested compensability at inception of the hearing, and claimant raised no objection, issue as to adequacy of the disclaimer to contest compensability could not be raised for the first time on appeal. See also, Camp, § 31-275(1); § 31-298; § 31-301 Appeal procedure; § 31-301 Factual findings.

Respondent appealed trial commissioner’s determination that claimant’s pre-employment physical in 1976 revealed no evidence of heart disease or hypertension and claim for § 7-433c C.G.S. benefits in 2007 was therefore timely. Record indicated that doctor who performed pre-employment physical recorded a blood pressure reading of 120/90 but reported that claimant’s examination was normal and claimant was qualified for position as fireman. CRB affirmed, noting that no additional information from examining physician was submitted into record, claimant’s treating physician since 2002 was equivocal as to whether he ever informed claimant he was hypertensive, and claimant testified that prior to the angiogram of 2007, despite elevated blood pressure readings over the years, he was never told he had hypertension or heart disease or instructed to make lifestyle changes. See also, Kohn, § 7-433c, § 31-301 Factual findings.

Claimant asserted both repetitive trauma injuries and injuries sustained on a specific date. Insurer argued for the first time on appeal that since employer did not file a Form 43 contesting liability for the repetitive trauma claim that the other insurance carrier was barred from presenting evidence contesting link between that injury and causation of claimant’s injury. CRB denied this relief. Issue was not considered by the trial commissioner and could not be considered for the first time on appeal. In addition, preclusion is a form of relief exclusively available to the claimant who never filed a Motion to Preclude. See also, Haines, § 31-301 Factual findings.

Claimant filed Motion to Preclude over 1 year after filing claim. Respondents acknowledged they had never filed a disclaimer but argued this was an “accepted” claim and therefore preclusion did not lie. Trial commissioner originally accepted this position but after CRB remanded the matter (see Pringle v. National Lumber, Inc., 5728 CRB-3-12-2 (February 6, 2013)); trial commissioner reached factual findings that found preclusion was warranted in this matter. On appeal, CRB upheld result. Respondents failed to communicate acceptance of the claim in writing and the respondent’s conduct did not preserve the “safe harbor” from preclusion as claimant was terminated from a light duty job before a disclaimer or voluntary agreement was issued. Majority cited Monaco-Selmer v. Total Customer Service, 5622 CRB-3-10-12 (January 19, 2012) as on point and distinguished case from Negron v. CVS Caremark Corporation, 5870 CRB-4-13-8 (July 17, 2014) and Pagan v. Carey Wiping Materials, Inc., 5829 CRB-6-13-4 (March 28, 2014). Mastropietro, concurring. Precedent in Adzima v. UAC/Norden Division, 177 Conn. 107 (1979) supports allowing respondents to contest extend of disability in cases where they fail to contest initial liability. In addition, providing light duty work can under proper circumstances constitute payments to claimant that satisfy statute. However, in absence of a Motion to Correct by respondents, CRB cannot now ascertain how the facts found by the trial commissioner do not support preclusion.

Second Injury Fund appealed Finding and Award on basis that claimant, injured while working for uninsured home improvement company, erroneously filed notice of claim against employer’s trade name rather than against employer personally, thus depriving Workers’ Compensation Commission of subject matter jurisdiction. Fund also contended that claimant’s failure to amend said notice compromised Fund’s recoupment rights pursuant to §§ 31-355 (c) and 31-355a C.G.S. Record indicated that employer, a sole proprietor, appeared pro se at proceedings below at which she exercised her right to testify, review exhibits and cross-examine claimant. CRB affirmed, noting that record did not support inference that notice of claim prejudiced employer and trier�s reference to employer’s full name in Finding and Award cured any alleged defects in original notice of claim. See also, Burch, § 31-301 Factual findings.

Respondent appealed trial commissioner’s determination that § 7-433c C.G.S. claim brought by Deputy Fire Chief was timely filed. Record indicated that although claimant had history of elevated blood pressure readings and treating physician had recommended lifestyle changes in 2008, claimant did not file notice of claim until after hospitalization for high blood pressure four years later. CRB affirmed, noting that in Ciarlelli v. Hamden, 299 Conn. 265 (2010), Supreme Court held that one-year statute of limitations in hypertension cases does not commence until medical professional informs claimant of hypertension diagnosis and record contained unambiguous testimony from treating physician that he had not diagnosed claimant with systemic hypertension prior to claimant’s hospitalization. See also, Conroy, § 7-433c; § 31-301 Factual findings.

Claimant is the estate of the decedent and appealed from a ruling on a Motion to Dismiss. Commissioner found the Commission lacked jurisdiction to hear claims brought by an estate. On appeal, CRB considered terms of § 31-294c(a) C.G.S. and determined this statute authorized a “personal representative” to bring a claim, and made claims by an estate jurisdictionally feasible. Matter remanded to ascertain what statutory remedies were available based on facts in case. See also, Rock, § 31-306; § 31-307; § 31-308(b); § 31-308(d).

Wiblyi v. McDonald’s Corporation, 5883 CRB-1-13-10 (October 3, 2014), rev’d and remanded, 168 Conn. App. 77 (2016) and aff’d, 168 Conn. App. 92 (2016).

Claimant appealed trial commissioner’s denial of Motion to Preclude brought eleven years after original notice of injury, arguing that trier’s decision to deny preclusion due to laches and prejudice constituted an abuse of discretion. Respondents cross-appealed on basis that claimant failed to sustain his burden of proof that notice of claim was properly served on employer pursuant to §§ 31-294c(b) and 31-321 C.G.S. CRB held that trier was prohibited as matter of law from denying statutory remedy of preclusion on basis of equitable doctrine such as laches and remanded claimant’s appeal for additional findings relative to whether statutory requirements for preclusion had been satisfied. CRB also remanded cross-appeal for additional findings after concluding that record contained ambiguities regarding circumstances of service of notice of claim which did not fully support conclusions drawn by trier. On appeal, Appellate Court affirmed that equitable doctrine of laches could not be applied to Motion to Preclude in light of legislative omission in establishing a time limit for such motions. However, Appellate Court reversed and remanded board’s remand of cross-appeal, holding that because trier’s findings were supported by evidence and were neither inconsistent nor contradictory, board had abused its discretion by reassessing evidentiary record. See also, Wiblyi, § 31-301 Factual Findings; § 31-321.

Claimant was dependent spouse of a Bridgeport police officer who had received a § 7-433c C.G.S. award. Upon his death, she filed a claim for § 31-306 C.G.S. benefits and relied on a death certificate that stated cause of death was coronary arterial disease to assert claim was due to a compensable injury. Respondents failed to take any responsive action within 28 days of the Form 30D being filed and when claimant filed a Motion to Preclude, trial commissioner granted preclusion. Respondents appealed, arguing that Fredette v. Connecticut Air National Guard, 283 Conn. 813 (2007) stood for principle that claimant did not have time limit to file a dependency claim and therefore there was no time limitation for the respondents to respond. CRB rejected this argument, pointing out that a similar argument in McCullough v. Swan Engraving, Inc., et al, 5875 CRB 4-13-8 (August 5, 2014) had been rejected by the CRB. Also plain language of the Form 30D put respondents on notice a disclaimer was necessary. Issues herein controlled by Tardy v. Abington Constructors, Inc., 71 Conn. App. 140 (2002) which stands for principle that when respondents fail to respond to a claim for survivor benefits, preclusion may lie. See also, King, § 31-275(16); § 31-301 Factual findings; § 31-306.

Claimant was nurse in hospice unit and filed claim for repetitive trauma injuries to back and knees. Trial commissioner denied claim for back injuries but found knee injuries compensable. Commissioner ordered parties to use “best efforts” to resolve issues as compensating the claimant. Respondents appealed, arguing claim was filed in untimely manner and that claimant’s evidence did not establish causation. Claimant cross-appealed seeking remand for hearing on amount of compensation due the claimant. CRB affirmed trial commissioner as to respondent’s appeal but remanded for new hearing on unresolved issues. Evidence on record demonstrated that the claimant continued to be exposed to injurious trauma to her knees within one year of filing her notice of claim; therefore as per standards in Goulbourne v. State/Department of Correction, 5192 CRB-1-07-1 (January 17, 2008) and Russell v. Mystic Seaport Museum, Inc., 252 Conn. 596 (2000) Commission had jurisdiction over the claim. See also, Smithwick, § 31-275(1); § 31-301 Factual findings.

Claimant, a mason, appealed trial commissioner’s dismissal of claim for knee symptoms. Trier determined that because claimant’s repetitive trauma injury more closely resembled accidental injury rather than occupational disease, and notice was filed more than one year after last date of injurious exposure, Workers’ Compensation Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction. CRB affirmed, noting that although medical reports in evidence supported causation, claimant failed to establish that injury was “distinctively associated with” or “peculiar to the occupation” of mason and testimony demonstrated that claimant had constructive knowledge that symptoms were work-related many years before filing claim. See also, DiGiovanni, § 31-275(15); § 31-275(16); § 31-301 Factual findings.

On remand from CRB, trial commissioner reached determination as to whether claimant’s § 7-433c claim was jurisdictionally valid. Claimant had felt ill and was transported by co-worker to hospital, and was not diagnosed with hypertension until later date. Claimant had not filed Form 30C within one year of those events, but claimed as employer “furnished medical care” notice statute had been satisfied. Trial commissioner concluded to contrary and dismissed claim due to noncompliance with notice statute. CRB affirmed decision, distinguishing case on the facts from Hodges v. Federal Express Corporation, 5717 CRB-7-12-1 (January 4, 2013). See also, Henry, § 7-433c.

Claim for dependent’s benefits was filed by surviving spouse more than one year from death of original claimant. Respondents challenged claim as untimely, but claimant argued that pursuant to Tolli v. Connecticut Quarries Co., 101 Conn. 109 (1924) her claim was timely. Trial commissioner agreed with claimant and respondent appealed. CRB remanded matter for de novo hearing on jurisdiction. Tolli distinguished from present case on the facts. In addition, as to the law a subsequently adopted statute (§ 31-306b C.G.S.) governs the timeliness of survivor benefits claims. As parties did not litigate whether based on the facts that statute made the claim jurisdictionally valid, matter was remanded. See also, McCullough, § 31-306 C.G.S.

Claimant reported injury and respondents provided medical care and physical therapy. After RME suggested further treatment unnecessary respondents filed Form 43 citing date of incident and denying further treatment. Claimant then filed Form 30C seeking benefits and later filed Motion to Preclude. Trial commissioner denied Motion to Preclude and claimant appealed. CRB affirmed decision. Pre-emptive disclaimer comported with the standards delineated in Lamar v. Boehringer Ingelheim Corp., 5588 CRB-7-10-9 (August 25, 2011), aff’d, 138 Conn. App. 826 (2012), cert denied, 307 Conn. 943 (2013). In accord with Dubrosky v. Boehringer Ingelheim Corporation, 145 Conn. App. 261 (2013) respondents were within “safe harbor” of providing medical care to claimant when they filed Form 43. Claimant not denied benefits and was placed on notice as to respondent’s position prior to her filing a Notice of Claim.

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s conclusion that jurisdiction was lacking. Claimant did not file a written notice of claim within 1 year from the date she fell nor did she satisfy any of the constructive notice provisions. Trial commissioner’s determination that claimant failed to prove she was furnished with medical care sufficient to put the employer on notice affirmed. Whether medical care was furnished so as to supplant the need for a written notice of claim is a factual determination to be made by the trier of fact. Here the claimant did not seek medical treatment until nearly 8 months after her fall at work and the employer did not direct her to go to the hospital’s ER but merely gave her permission. Further, the ER records did not mention the fall at work some months before. See also, Valenti, 31-301 Factual findings; 31-301-9.

Claimant asserted a work related injury. Employer immediately provided medical treatment after incident and claimant did not miss work. Claimant filed a Form 30C after treatment ended and respondents filed a Form 43 more than 28 days later. Two years after filing the Form 30C claimant filed a Motion to Preclude. Trial commissioner denied Motion; finding respondents had appropriately responded to the injury prior to the Form 30C having been filed. Claimant appealed. CRB affirmed the commissioner, citing precedent in Dubrosky v. Boehringer Ingelheim Corporation, 145 Conn. App. 261 (2013) and finding no material difference between the cases. CRB also said scrivener’s error in Form 43 was immaterial, finding the case indistinguishable from Duglenski v. Waterbury, 4913 CRB-5-05-2 (January 18, 2006). Mastropietro, concurring: Case herein demonstrates that preclusion is now being used under circumstances inconsistent with precedent in Menzies v. Fisher, 165 Conn. 338 (1973) and urged appellate courts to revisit whether precedent in Harpaz v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 286 Conn. 102 (2008) and Donahue v. Veridiem, Inc., 291 Conn. 537 (2009) requires clarification.

Claimant filed a Form 30C within one year of last exposure to alleged repetitive trauma injury. Respondents did not file a timely Form 43 or commence payments and the claimant filed a Motion to Preclude. Respondents argued that they had a defense of “subject matter jurisdiction” alleging claimant was not actually working on day cited in Form 30C. Trial commissioner granted preclusion and CRB affirmed. Record indicates respondents conceded employer-employee relationship with claimant at time of alleged injury and for months thereafter. Argument that on date cited in notice she was not working is a causation defense, not a jurisdictional defense. CRB cited Volta v. United Parcel Service, 5612 CRB-7-10-12 (January 31, 2012) as precedent indistinguishable from this case.

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s denial of claimant’s Motion to Preclude. CRB held that unlike the factual scenario in Monaco-Selmer v. Total Customer Service, 5622 CRB-3-10-12 (January 19, 2012) the respondents in this matter paid benefits timely and proffered a voluntary agreement to the claimant thereby preserving its right to defend the claim. Further the facts found by the commissioner did not result from an abuse of discretion. See also, Pagan, § 31-301 Factual findings.

Respondent appealed from Finding granting preclusion to the claimant. Respondent argued that as she was contesting jurisdiction to the claim she did not have to file a disclaimer, arguing that this would “abet a fraud.” She also argued Form 30C was invalid as it did not state a place of injury. Trial commissioner found employer-employee relationship existed and granted preclusion. CRB affirmed decision. Respondent contesting subject matter jurisdiction should file disclaimer advising claimant claim was denied for that reason. Given record in case showing pervasive control of the claimant’s activities by the respondent absence of place of injury in Form 30C did not prejudice the respondent. CRB upheld preclusion. See also, Reid, § 31-275(9); § 31-275(10); § 31-278; § 31-298; § 31-301 Appeal procedure; § 31-301 Factual findings.

Claimant developed hepatitis C which he testified was likely due to exposure to infected blood from a needle stick while employed as a paramedic. Respondents argued that such an illness was not unusually common to first responders and therefore not an occupational disease. Respondents this argued that claimant’s notice of claimant; which was more than 20 years after exposure to disease, was untimely to create jurisdiction. CRB found circumstances generally similar to Estate of Doe v. Dept. of Correction, 268 Conn. 753 (2004) as claimant’s employment created risk of contracting illness via blood borne disease. Ricigliano v. Ideal Forging Corp., 280 Conn. 723 (2006) stands for principle that timeline for filing notice of an occupational diasse commences upon discovery. Notice in this case was timely. See also, Woodmansee, § 31-275(15).

Claimant filed first report of injury and respondents filed a Form 43 and presented prescription card to claimant which he did not use. Claimant never filed a Form 30C and after one year, respondents argued claim was barred as untimely. Trial commissioner dismissed claim due to lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, claimant argued that “totality of the circumstances” provided an exception to formal notice under § 31-294c C.G.S. and commissioner should have found jurisdiction. CRB affirmed decision. While a respondent asserting a nonclaim defense after filing a pre-emptive Form 43 creates an issue of equity to the claimant, this is a factual issue for the trial commissioner to address. Burden is on the claimant in the absence of a Form 30C to prove exception to formal notice. Argument that Form 43 as a matter of law concedes jurisdiction inconsistent with holding in Gaffney v. Stamford, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 257, 2219 CRB-7-94-11 (May 24, 1996), which CRB must accord stare decisis.

Claimant said he was injured while at work raising lawn mower to truck; and that this incident was a substantial factor in his need for back surgery. Trial commissioner found claimant credible and credited opinion of treating physicians. On appeal, respondents argued they were prejudiced by claim form which stated an inaccurate date of injury. CRB affirmed trial commissioner who determined respondents not prejudiced as claimant actively pursued claim and sought hearings within one year of injury. CRB cited precedent in Berry v. State/Dept. of Public Safety, 5162 CRB-3-06-11 (December 20, 2007) and Surowiecki v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 4233 CRB-8-00-5 (May 24, 2001) that errors in claim forms must be substantial to challenge jurisdiction; respondents Form 43 acknowledged an injury at work had occurred and “totality of the circumstances” test as promulgated in Hayden-LeBlanc v. New London Broadcasting, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 3, 1373 CRD-2-92-1 (January 5, 1994) for determining compliance with § 31-294c C.G.S. supports trial commissioner. See also, Kingston, § 31-275(1); § 31-294d; § 31-301 Factual findings.

Claimant filed Form 30C and within 28 days respondent filed Form 43; respondent previously commenced making payments without prejudice of weekly disability benefits. Respondent ceased making these payments, did not file a Form 36 and did not file a second Form 43 for about two more months. Claimant filed Motion to Preclude. Trial commissioner deemed initial Form 43 legally inadequate. Commissioner also determined that although payments without prejudice stayed preclusion, this protection was lost when payments were discontinued. Second Form 43 filed too late to legally bar preclusion. Respondents appealed. CRB affirmed decision. Initial Form 43 did not contest legal viability of the claim as required by Tovish v. Gerber Electronics, 19 Conn. App. 273 (1989). “Safe harbor” from preclusion as defined in Monaco-Selmer v. Total Customer Service, 5622 CRB-3-10-12 (January 19, 2012) lasts only as long as payments are made, once such payments lapse an effective Form 43 must be filed or preclusion will lie.

Trier concluded that claimant died of sepsis following exposure to Legionella at employer’s sewer treatment plant. CRB affirmed trier’s compensability findings on basis of medical record despite expert’s lack of “absolute certainty” regarding etiology of claimant’s sepsis, and declined to address whether Legionnaire’s Disease constituted occupational disease as contemplated by § 31-275(15) C.G.S. CRB rejected respondents’ claim that trier lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to deficient notice of claim, noting that prior trial commissioner’s Finding and Award regarding sufficiency of notice adequately reflected analysis set forth in Berry v. State/Dept. of Public Safety, 5162 CRB-3-06-11 (December 20, 2007). CRB found respondents’ allegations of due process deprivation without merit and also denied claimant’s Motion to Dismiss predicated on respondents’ compliance with instant Finding and Award, noting that dismissal would vitiate appeal provisions codified at § 31-301 C.G.S., et. seq. CRB affirmed trier’s denial of Motion to Correct. See also, Estate of Haburey, § 31-275(1), § 31-275(15), § 31-301. Appeal Procedure, § 31-301. Factual Findings, § 31-301-04, § 31-306.

Claimant had sustained elbow injury while employed by Barden, and subsequently worked for other firms. Claimant had elbow surgery performed. Export witness retained by Barden opined that later repetitive trauma at work was 20% responsible for present disability and Barden filed Form 43 disclaiming responsibility under theory in Hatt v. Burlington Coat Factory, 263 Conn. 279 (2003). Trial commissioner denied relief, finding matter a case of “reverse apportionment” inconsistent with Stevens v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 5215 CRB-4-07-4 (March 26, 2008). CRB affirmed decision. Claimant did not participate in hearing, creating jurisdictional and evidentiary impediments. Claimant took no steps to place subsequent employers on notice he might have sustained a compensable injury while working with them. Barden failed to obtain testimony from claimant corroborating expert medical opinion. Hearing notices did not cite statute permitting relief against subsequent employers. CRB distinguished case on facts from Kelly v. Dunkin’ Donuts, 4621 CRB-4-03-2 (April 5, 2004). See also, Antonowicz, § 31-299b; § 31-349.

The Compensation Review Board reversed commissioner’s denial of Motion To Preclude. Claimant filed a Form 30C in 2000. Respondent paid medical bills. Respondent did not file a Form 43 until 8 years later. If a respondent pays benefits it is accorded one year from the time the claimant files a Form 30C to file a Form 43.

Trier denied Motion to Preclude having determined that claim had never been contested and preclusion was therefore “contrary to the letter and spirit” of Workers Compensation Act. CRB remanded for additional factual findings. CRB also noted that because neither trier nor parties had benefit of Appellate Court’s decision in Callender v. Reflexite Corp., 137 Conn. App. 324 (2012) when Pringle was tried, trier may choose to reconsider his decision in light of Callender or parties may wish to stay further proceedings relative to claimant’s Motion to Preclude until Supreme Court issues its ruling in Callender.

Respondent filed “pre-emptive” Form 43 which incorrectly referenced injury to claimant’s left, rather than right, knee. Trier granted Motion to Preclude. CRB reversed. Although Form 43 requires body part be listed, statutory provisions of § 31-294c(b) C.G.S. do not specifically articulate that body part be listed in notice of contest. Trier could not reasonably infer that claimant was prejudiced by deficiency. Denial of claimant’s Motion to Correct constituted error. See also, Tanguay, § 31-301-4.

Claimant reported injury on job and was transported by co-workers to hospital. Claimant was diagnosed as having herniated disc at hospital. Claimant filed first report of injury, respondent filed pre-emptive Form 43 disclaiming liability, and no Form 30C was filed within one year of incident. Respondents filed Motion to Dismiss alleging claimant failed to adhere to statutory notice requirement. Trial commissioner found circumstances, including letter from claimant’s counsel, put respondents on notice. CRB affirmed on appeal. Case on point with Funaioli v. New London, 52 Conn. App. 194 (1999) and Hayden-LeBlanc v. New London Broadcasting, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 3, 1373 CRD 2-92-1 (January 5, 1994) where totality of the circumstances puts respondent on notice; which was demonstrated when they filed a Form 43. This defense contested claim solely on causation grounds, not on subject matter jurisdiction.

Claimant filed claim for hearing loss alleging it was due to repetitive trauma at workplace. Trial commissioner found claim compensable. Respondent appealed, arguing that medical evidence supported their position claimant ceased being exposed to injurious noise more than one year prior to filing his claim; thus making claim untimely. CRB affirmed trial commissioner. Claimant and treating physician testified to claimant being exposed to injurious noise from power tool use up to date he left respondent’s employ; trial commissioner could reasonably rely on this evidence to find claim jurisdictionally valid. CRB found case more akin to Marandino v. Prometheus Pharmacy, 294 Conn. 564 (2010) than DiNuzzo v. Dan Perkins Chevrolet Geo. Inc., 294 Conn. 132 (2009). See also, Palmieri, § 31-275(16); § 31-301 Factual findings.

Claimant fell in parking lot and filed timely Form 30C. Claimant treated for injury but bills not submitted until weeks later; when respondent paid them promptly. Respondent filed a Form 43 challenging liability more than 28 days after receipt of Form 30C. Claimant filed Motion to Preclude. Trial commissioner granted motion. Respondents appealed; arguing payment for medical care provided safe harbor from preclusion and it was impossible to render payment within 28 days. CRB upheld trial commissioner. When only feasible response within 28 days of the filing of a Form 30C for a respondent is to file a Form 43, Donahue v. Veridiem, Inc., 291 Conn. 537 (2009) mandates that such a disclaimer be filed or the claimant may seek preclusion. Appellate Court determined that under circumstances in this case, respondents presented valid case of “impossibility” which absolved them of compliance with the precedent in Donahue. See also, Dubrosky, § 31-294d.

Claimant suffered cardiac event while at work in 2005 and was treated thereafter. Respondent filed Form 43. Claimant later filed Firm 30C in 2008 alleging hypertension, heart disease and sinus tachycardia. Respondent did not file a timely Form 43 to this claim. Claimant later filed Motion to Preclude which trial commissioner granted on issues of heart disease and sinus tachycardia. Commissioner also determined that hypertension case lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Respondent appealed granting of Motion to Preclude, CRB affirmed commissioner; fact-driven decision herein. Claimant appealed arguing they had no notice jurisdictional issue was going to be decided. CRB sustained appeal; record did not reflect parties on notice jurisdictional issue would be decided. Case remanded for further proceedings. See also, Henry, § 31-275 (16); § 31-298; § 31-301 Appeal procedure.

Dependent widow of employee who died of pancreatic cancer filed two notices of occupational disease claim. Respondents contended first notice of claim, filed within one year of employee’s death, was legally insufficient because Form 30C did not contain widow’s name or identify type of benefits being sought. Respondents argued second Form 30C was legally insufficient and untimely as it did not identify type of benefits sought and was filed two and one-half years after employee’s death. Trier found first Form 30C timely and sufficient but found second Form 30C untimely on basis that claimant had “formed a belief” regarding causation of employee’s pancreatic cancer almost two years before filing second Form 30C. Respondents appealed and claimant cross-appealed. CRB affirmed findings relative to first notice of claim, noting that Form 30C clearly indicated employee had died and, consistent with Berry v. State/Dept. of Public Safety, 5162 CRB-3-06-11 (December 20, 2007), provided respondents with reasonable notice that survivor’s benefits were being sought. CRB reversed trier’s findings relative to second notice of claim, noting that proper analysis for assessing date of commencement of three-year statute of limitations for occupational disease hinged on identifying date of first manifestation of symptom of occupational disease. Because trier reasonably inferred that “first manifestation” occurred when employee’s son filed application for federal benefits pursuant to Department of Labor’s Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program, second Form 30C was timely as it was filed within three years of date of federal filing. CRB also noted that parties attended an informal hearing within this three-year window. See also, Estate of Greenberg, § 31-275(15); § 31-301; Factual findings; § 31-301-04; § 31-306.

Claimant said he was injured in 2006 at work on day when shop closed, but did not file a first report of injury, a hearing request or a Form 30C until 2009. Claimant said he verbally informed firm’s principal and treated for injury utilizing group health insurance. Trial commissioner did not find claimant met any exception to notice under § 31-294c C.G.S. and dismissed claim as time barred. CRB upheld decision on appeal. Case distinguished from Spencer v. Manhattan Bagel Company, 5419 CRB-8-09-1 (January 22, 2010) as employer did not bring claimant to a medical facility and Verrinder v. Matthew’s Tru Colors Painting & Restoration, 4936 CRB-4-05-4 (December 6, 2006) where a timely Form 30C was filed. Instead, CRB found case indistinguishable from Miller v. State of Connecticut/Judicial Branch, 5584 CRB-7-10-8 (November 28, 2011) where there was no medical care exception found and an untimely Form 30C deprived the Commission of jurisdiction.

Claimant appealed denial of Motion to Preclude and dismissal of claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, contending trier erroneously relied on respondents’ expert evidence in reaching conclusion that repetitive trauma claim was untimely filed. Claimant’s notice of claim used last date of employment as date of injury and trier accepted evidence from respondents’ expert opining exposure to repetitive trauma occurred during earlier period of employment. CRB held that consistent with Russell v. Mystic Seaport Museum, Inc., 252 Conn. 596 (2000), notice of claim was sufficient on its face to support Motion to Preclude and reversed and remanded for additional proceedings. CRB cautioned that admission of evidence in new trial must comport with guidelines set forth in Harpaz v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 286 Conn. 102 (2008) and Donahue v. Veridiem, Inc., 91 Conn. 537 (2009). CRB also found trier’s denial of claimant’s Motion to Correct constituted error. See also, Volta, § 31 275(16)(A).

After claimant Filed 30C respondent made two payments of $150 and $100, and then, later filed Form 43. Claimant filed Motion to Preclude asserting Form 43 was untimely. Respondents argued statute allowed them to pay without prejudice. Trial Commissioner granted Motion to Preclude; found payments did not advise claimant they were without prejudice and did not comport with an appropriate compensation rate. CRB upheld trial commissioner. Harpaz v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 286 Conn. 102 (2008) requires respondents to promptly decide whether to contest a claim or exercise right to pay without prejudice. Respondent’s actions did not conform with statutory requirements to avoid preclusion. Isolated payment of arbitrary amount does not “commence” payment of compensation.

Respondent argued claimant’s Form 30C was invalid asserting respondent’s actual name was “Capital Improvements, LLC.” Trial commissioner found valid notice and CRB affirmed decision. Facts herein indistinguishable from Caus v. Paul Hug d/b/a Hug Construction Company, Hug Contracting Company, Crown Asphalt Paving, LLC, P. Hug Contracting, LLC, 5392 CRB-4-08-11 (January 22, 2010) and Antos v. Jaroslaw Korwek d/b/a Jerry’s Home Improvement, 5225 CRB-7-07-5 (April 4, 2008). Trial commissioner satisfied employer’s principal received timely notice of claim. See also, Diaz, § 31-275(9); § 31-275(10); § 31-288; § 31-291.

Claimant filed numerous incident reports as to work related accident within one year of incident but did not file a Form 30C until more than one year elapsed. Trial commissioner found claimant failed to effect notice to preserve jurisdiction and dismissed claim. CRB upheld dismissal. Constructive notice is not sufficient to engage the jurisdiction of this commission when a party does not adhere to the requirements of § 31-294c C.G.S. Case indistinguishable from Otero v. Bridgeport, 1713 CRB-4-93-4 (April 17, 1995).

Decedent died in Texas while on business trip. Dependent spouse filed claim in Texas and later in Connecticut, family’s place of residence. Respondent did not file timely disclaimer to Connecticut claim, and argued disclaimer to Texas claim constituted sufficient notice they were contesting Connecticut claim. Respondents also argued claim filed more than one year post-mortem was untimely. Trial commissioner found to contrary and granted Motion to Preclude. CRB affirmed trial commissioner. Plain meaning of statute requires disclaimers to be filed with commissioner. Precedent in Zolla v. John Cheeseman Trucking, Inc., 5261 CRB-5-07-8 (August 4, 2008); Chambers v. General Dynamics Corp./Electric Boat Division, 4952 CRB-8-05-6 ( June 7, 2006), aff’d, 283 Conn. 840 (2007) and Kuehl v. Z-Loda Systems Engineering, 265 Conn. 525 (2003) stand for proposition filings in other jurisdictions ineffective to provide notice under Chapter 568. As to timeliness of filing, case indistinguishable from Dauti v. Lighting Services, Inc., 5553 CRB-5-10-5 (April 25, 2011), aff’d, 137 Conn. App. 795 (2012), which found similar claim within commission jurisdiction. CRB found preclusion required under precedent in Harpaz v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 286 Conn. 102 (2008) and Donahue v. Veridiem, Inc., 291 Conn. 537 (2009). See also, Wikander, § 31-300.

Claimant filed for heart & hypertension benefits and respondents obtained dismissal at trial level; asserting claim was filed too late. Claimant appealed asserting Ciarlelli v. Hamden, 299 Conn. 265 (2010) would cause claim to be found timely. CRB affirmed trial commissioner. Applying Ciarlelli to facts on record still supports dismissal; claimant had received unequivocal diagnosis of hypertension more than one year prior to filing claim. CRB rejected claimant’s argument Ciarlelli stood for a “medication standard“ wherein only prescription of medication triggered obligation to file a claim; plain language of Supreme Court decision stood for “diagnosis standard.” See also, Tesla, § 7-433c.

Lamar v. Boehringer Ingelheim Corp., 5588 CRB-7-10-9 (August 25, 2011), aff’d, 138 Conn. App. 826 (2012), cert denied, 307 Conn. 943 (2012).

Respondent filed Form 43 in advance of claimant filing Form 30C. Respondent served disclaimer via certified mail which was not picked up. Claimant filed Motion to Preclude, asserting deficiencies in service and deficiencies of text of disclaimer, in particular date of injury. Trial commission denied motion and CRB upheld trial commissioner on appeal. Precedent permits pre-emptive filing of a Form 43. Section 31-321 makes service of notices via certified mail legal service. Trial commissioner found any errors in disclaimer immaterial. CRB found disclaimer comported with requirements in Tovish v. Gerber Electronics, 19 Conn. App. 273 (1989) for an effective disclaimer. CRB also pointed out primary focus of date of injury was to ascertain if claim was jurisdictionally timely and in this matter claim was timely either under single injury or repetitive trauma theory of recovery. Case deemed more akin to Duglenski v. Waterbury, 4913 CRB-5-05-2 (January 18, 2006) and DiStasi v. Watertown Board of Education, 5010 CRB-5-05-10 (September 25, 2006) than Russell v. Mystic Seaport Museum, Inc., 252 Conn. 596 (2000). See also, Lamar, § 31-301 Appeal procedure; § 31-321.

See also, Rodriguez, § 7-433c C.G.S.

See, Savo, § 7-433c C.G.S.

Employee died of heart attack at work; dependent spouse did not commence claim until more than one year after death. Respondent argued claim was brought beyond statutory limitation. Trial commissioner dismissed claim. CRB reversed and found jurisdiction. Statute provides that dependent claims may be brought within two years from the date of the accident, or one year from the date of death, whichever is later. Claim in case within two years of accident and as per precedent in Merenski v. Greenwich Hospital Associates, Inc. a/k/a Greenwich Hospital, 4292 CRB-7-00-9 (September 12, 2001), claim is timely. Appellate Court affirmed decision. See also, Dauti, § 31-306.

Respondent appealed trier’s conclusions that claimant’s § 5-145a claim was timely filed and respondent failed to rebut presumption that claimant’s heart disease was causally connected to his employment as a Judicial Marshal. CRB affirmed, relying in part on Ciarlelli v. Hamden, 299 Conn. 265 (2010) in which Supreme Court held that one-year statute of limitations in hypertension cases commences when medical professional informs claimant of hypertension diagnosis. CRB determined that medical record did not support respondent’s contention that claimant’s heart disease pre dated his employment as Judicial Marshal or that claimant received a definitive diagnosis of heart disease prior to his emergency medical procedures in December 2005. CRB determined trier’s findings relative to subject matter jurisdiction were legally sufficient and affirmed trier’s denial of Motion to Correct, concluding that although trier inaccurately used term “heart attack” and quoted an incorrect date of hire in his findings, both errors were harmless. See also, Rizzo, § 5-145a, § 7-433c, § 31-301. Factual Findings, § 31-301-3, § 31-301-4.

Callender a/k/a Woodbury v. Reflexite Corporation, 5504 CRB-6-09-10 (October 8, 2010), rev’d, 137 Conn. App. 324 (2012), cert. granted, 307 Conn. 915 (2012), appeal withdrawn, S.C. 19040 (9/27/13).

CRB affirmed dismissal of Motion to Preclude. Claimant filed first notice of claim for repetitive trauma injuries but continued working for seventeen months during which time she received workers’ compensation benefits. Claimant filed second notice of claim for additional repetitive trauma injuries when she was no longer able to work and respondents failed to disclaim second notice. Claimant continued to receive benefits after she stopped working. CRB affirmed finding that preclusion did not lie based on Menzies v. Fisher, 165 Conn. 338 (1973) and its progeny which suggest that preclusion was intended to address “threshold failure” by employers to respond to claims and is not applicable to contests over extent of claimant’s disability. CRB also noted that because claimants are not required to file additional notices for new injuries arising from same incident, respondents should not be obligated to respond to unnecessary notices. CRB affirmed denial of Motion to Correct. Appellate Court reversed, holding that board improperly affirmed trier’s dismissal of Motion to Preclude on basis of merits of claim; because second notice of claim appeared to allege a new and separate injury and the employer failed to either file a new notice of contest or commence payment on the new claim within twenty-eight days, trial commissioner had no choice under statute but to grant motion to preclude. Callender v. Reflexite Corp., 137 Conn. App. 324 (2012). See also, Callender, § 31-301-4.

Claimant appealed dismissal of claim for permanent partial disability benefits, contending trier erroneously admitted respondents’ evidence in matter where Motion to Preclude had been granted. Trier had declined to award permanency benefits at higher rate recommended by claimant’s treating physician and instead accepted lower rate recommended by respondents’ expert and commissioner’s examiner. CRB reversed and remanded for a new trial on basis that trier’s decision to admit respondents’ brief along with medical records and deposition of respondents’ expert was improper and in direct contravention to Harpaz v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 286 Conn. 102 (2008) and Donahue v. Veridiem, Inc., 91 Conn. 537 (2009). CRB likewise determined that trier’s decision to take administrative notice of previously-ordered commissioner’s examination constituted error as record indicated commissioner’s examiner had relied in part on respondents’ expert�s evidence. See also, Sanchez, § 31-298.

Claimant employed as fireman for state military department and also was employed by Air National Guard. Claimant developed atrial fibrillation diagnosed on September 5, 2006 and had subsequent cardiac event September 10, 2006 during Guard drills. Claimant filed against state employer for injury under § 5-145a C.G.S. and state challenged claim asserting he was a federal employee. CRB upheld award. State focused on initial Form 30C fixing date of injury as September 10, 2006, when claimant on Guard duty, so as to assert injury not during state employment and that form prejudiced state. CRB found case governed by Berry v. State/Dept. of Public Safety, 5162 CRB-3-06-11 (December 20, 2007), respondent not prejudiced when claimant filed second Form 30C with date of diagnosis. Claimant also clearly stated claim against state employer at commencement of hearing and record demonstrated claimant spent vast majority of work at state employer. Appellate Court affirmed decision on appeal. See also, Jamieson, § 5-142a, § 5-145a, § 31-278, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Trial commissioner had sufficient evidence to support finding that claimant’s cardiac disease was caused by work-related stress. Under the repetitive trauma standard claim was commenced in timely manner. “Last date of exposure” standard governs such claims. See also, Goulbourne, § 5-142(a), § 31-275(16), § 31-294f, § 31-298, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301-9. Prior decision at Goulbourne v. State/Department of Correction, 5192 CRB-1-07-1 (January 17, 2008).

CRB upheld trier’s dismissal of claim due to untimely notice and affirmed trier’s refusal to expand scope of § 52-577d C.G.S. to workers’ compensation claims, holding that statutory language did not evince legislative intent to apply extended statute of limitations in civil sexual abuse claims for damages to workers’ compensation matters. CRB affirmed trier’s determination that conditions necessary to invoke medical care exception pursuant to § 31-294c(c) C.G.S. were not satisfied as record did not support finding that respondents furnished claimant with medical treatment during the applicable period. CRB affirmed trier’s determination that claimant did not provide notice of claim in substantial compliance with § 31-294c(a) C.G.S. until 2006 and held that victim statements by claimant and her mother read aloud at respondent employer’s sentencing hearing did not constitute notice as contemplated by statute. See also, Chance, § 31-284(a), § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-318.

Claimant appealed dismissal of claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction after trier concluded claimant neither filed a Form 30C within one year of the date of injury nor satisfied statutory conditions required to waive formal written notice. Record indicated claimant verbally informed employer of injury twice and on second occasion employer responded by driving claimant to chiropractor. Claimant contended requirements of medical care exception per § 31-294c(c) C.G.S. were satisfied but trier dismissed claim after determining employer did not pay medical bill associated with chiropractic visit. CRB reversed, citing Gesmundo v. Bush and Kulis v. Moll for proposition that applicability of medical care exception does not hinge upon payment of medical invoice but, rather, requires global assessment of factual circumstances to establish whether employer could reasonably expect that workers’ compensation claim might arise from workplace incident which prompted claimant’s need for medical care. CRB also held that denial of claimant’s Motion to Correct constituted error to the extent it was predicated on assumption that payment of medical invoice was required to invoke medical care exception. See also, Spencer, § 31-301-4.

Claimant filed Form 30C with assistant fire chief, then filed Motion to Preclude as no Form 43 filed within 28 days. Trial Commissioner granted preclusion and citing Harpaz v. Laidlaw Transit, 286 Conn. 102 (2008) case, barred respondents from presenting evidence. Commissioner found claimant sustained permanent partial disability. Respondents appealed. CRB upheld trial commissioner. Any ambiguity in Harpaz decision resolved by Donahue v, Veridiem, Inc., 291 Conn. 537 (2009) against respondents. Claimant complied with requirements in notice statute and respondents did not point to any prejudice; as assistant chief completed form employer clearly aware of circumstances. See also, Mehan, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-308(b), § 31-321.

Claimant obtained preclusion from respondent; then sought approval for surgery. Treating physician clearly found causation for surgery due to compensable injury; respondents claimed their expert refuted this position and should be relied on. Trial commissioner adopted treater’s opinion and some opinions of respondent’s expert and found surgery compensable. Respondents appealed. CRB upheld. As per Donahue v. Veridiem, Inc., 291 Conn. 537 (2009); once preclusion is granted trial commissioner should not consider testimony of respondent’s expert witness. Sufficient evidence from treating physician in record to sustain award. See also White, § 31- 294d C.G.S., § 31-301. Factual findings C.G.S.

Parties entered into two stipulated agreements to pay claimant heart and hypertension benefits pursuant to § 7 433c C.G.S. Following publication of Genesky v. East Lyme, 4600 CRB 8 02 12 (December 8, 2003), employer sought to modify awards pursuant to provisions of § 31-315 C.G.S. arguing that trier never had subject matter jurisdiction to approve the awards because provisions of § 7- 433c C.G.S. were not applicable to the Redding police department. Trier agreed both stipulated agreements were void ab initio but, per Salmeri v. Department of Public Safety, 70 Conn. App. 321 (2002), cert. denied, 261 Conn. 919 (2002), determined claimant’s initial incorrect selection of statutory remedy was irrelevant and, per DeMello v. Cheshire, 3633 CRB-8-97-6 (August 26, 1998), claimant’s Form 30C provided employer with sufficient notice of his application for benefits. Trier ordered parties to administer claim as if it had been brought pursuant to Chapter 568; trier also concluded respondent employer had improperly terminated payments and ordered further proceedings to determine amount of additional benefits due the claimant. CRB found conditions for modification pursuant to § 31-315 C.G.S. were not satisfied, in that publication of Genesky neither constituted a “changed condition of fact” nor warranted extension of equitable relief to respondents because of accident, mistake of fact, or fraud. CRB reversed and remanded. See also, Jones, § 7-433c, § 31 296 (discontinuance of payments), § 31-315.

Claimant sought hypertension benefits in 2005. Respondents argued claim was untimely pursuant to §31-294c C.G.S. Trial commissioner concluded claimant had been treated for hypertension between 1999 and 2004, and determined claim was untimely. Claimant appealed. CRB upheld trial commissioner. Case on the facts is indistinguishable from Chernak v. Stamford-Police Department, 5012 CRB-7-05-10 (December 13, 2006). See also, Wabno, § 7-433c C.G.S.

CRB affirmed trier’s dismissal of § 7-433c claim for lack of jurisdiction. Claimant developed hypertension during pregnancy in 2001 which in subsequent years appeared to resolve only with medication. Trier determined claimant’s application for benefits filed in September of 2004 was untimely. Claimant argued McNerney v. New Haven, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 330, 2098 CRB-3-94-7 (June 25, 1996) (ten year lapse between manifestations of claimant’s hypertension symptoms led to finding that second manifestation was new injury) should have controlled. Claimant also filed Motion for Articulation seeking clarification of the category of injury, per § 31-294c, trier had used to determine applicable statute of limitations, which motion was denied. See also, Biehn, § 7-433c, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Claimant asserted disc herniation was due to lifting pallets at work. Respondents challenged testimony as inconsistent. Trial commissioner found treating physician persuasive and found injury compensable, but also stated he thought injury was more likely “repetitive trauma”. Respondents appealed. CRB upheld. While record may not support theory of repetitive trauma injury rather than a single incident, claim was timely under either theory of recovery. See also, Sweet, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-275(16).

Claimant asserted rotator cuff injury was due to repetitive trauma at work. Physician ascribed injury to “overhead work.” Evidence was the claimant had engaged in substantial overhead work in prior years, but had not performed much in year prior to accident. Trial Commissioner denied claim as untimely. CRB upheld. Claimant failed in burden of persuasion work activities during year prior to claim were substantial factor in his injury. See also, Strajkowski, § 31-275(16), § 31-301. Factual findings.

CRB affirmed trier’s dismissal of § 7-433c claim for lack of jurisdiction. Trier determined notice of claim was untimely as claimant was diagnosed with hypertension in May of 2003 but did not file application for benefits until June of 2004. Trier also denied claimant’s Motion to Correct because proposed corrections primarily sought to reconfigure factual findings in a light more favorable to claimant. See also, Thompson, § 7-433c, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301-4.

Claimant was interstate truck driver employed by Ohio firm who suffered heart attack on the job in New Jersey. Respondents failed to file disclaimer within statutory timeline to contest claim filed in Connecticut. Respondents argued exclusive jurisdiction over this injury was in Ohio pursuant to agreement with employee. Trial commissioner found such defenses could not be advanced as respondents failed to file a timely disclaimer, thus claim presumed compensable. CRB upheld decision on appeal. Harpaz v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 286 Conn. 102 (2008) requires claim to be deemed compensable when no timely disclaimer is filed. Respondent’s defenses did not go to commission’s subject matter jurisdiction. See also, Zolla, § 31-278, § 31-290, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Claim for a back injury not barred by claimant’s failure to file a written notice of claim where medical treatment was provided at a medical facility operated by the respondent. Although claimant did not seek treatment for the back injury until nearly 6 months after her fall at work, she was provided care for the back injury within one year of the fall. See also, Dobbs, § 31-275.

CRB affirmed trier’s dismissal of claim as untimely. Claimant became aware of his high blood pressure in January of 1993 but did not file Form 30C until May of 1994. Claimant elected to seek benefits pursuant § 31 275, et. seq., rather than § 7-433c but evidentiary record did not support inference that injury had arisen out of or in the course of employment. Trier also denied Motion to Preclude as moot. See also, Nettleton, § 31-275(1), § 31-301. Factual findings.

Claimant filed claim for repetitive trauma neck injury more than one year after last exposure to trauma. Trial Commissioner dismissed claim as untimely. Claimant appealed, asserting Discuillo v. Stone & Webster, 242 Conn. 570 (1997) requires the trial commissioner to reach a specific finding as to whether, for jurisdictional purposes, a repetitive trauma injury “more closely resembles” an accidental injury or an occupational disease. CRB upheld trial commissioner after extensively examining Discuillo. Later appellate precedent such as Malchik v. Division of Criminal Justice, 266 Conn. 728 (2003) does not apply this test; nor is it called for in the “plain meaning” of the definitional statutes. Additionally, trial commissioner made a de facto ruling on this issue adverse to claimant by denying his Motion to Correct. See also, Veilleux, § 31-275(15), § 31-275(16).

Hypertension diagnosed March 2003. Hearing held June 2003. Trier dismissed claim without mentioning hearing, and without making findings as to when claimant developed symptoms of hypertension, or knew/should have known that such symptoms existed. CRB ruled that failure to mention hearing was plain error, which was not waived by claimant. Remanded for further proceedings concerning timeliness of § 7-433c claim. See, Gladstone, § 31-301-9 (Motion to Submit Additional Evidence denied). Also cited at Gladstone, § 7-433c.

Claimant injured at home site and filed his Form 30C against his employer as “Jerry’s Home Improvement.” Respondent filed timely Form 43, and then later filed motion to dismiss claim asserting defective notice deprived Commission of jurisdiction; employer was actually single member limited liability company. Trial Commissioner denied motion and respondent appealed. CRB upheld commissioner. Commissioner found firm was alter ego of principal and respondent not prejudiced by error; case virtually identical to Rourke v. Summit Tree Service L.L.C., 4297 CRB-8-00-9 (August 22, 2001) where error had “no legal consequence”. Additionally, § 34-132(a) C.G.S. imputes notice filed against an L.L.C.’s member to the L.L.C. See also, Antos, § 31-300. Appeal procedure.

Claimant alleged that cardiac problem was misdiagnosed when pain caused by 1996 lifting incident was solely attributed to shoulder, which had been injured previously. Medical care was immediately provided for 1996 injury, which was diagnosed as labral tear. In April 2000, claimant suffered myocardial infarction, requiring coronary artery bypass surgery. A cardiologist stated that pain during 1996 lifting injury was both orthopedic and anginal. Form 30C was filed in June 2001 claiming heart condition misdiagnosed following lifting incident. Trier found insufficient evidence to show myocardial infarction was causally related to lifting incident, and found 2001 Form 30C untimely filed. CRB affirmed. Trier could have reasonably found insufficient evidence to show lifting incident contributed to heart disease symptoms and heart attack. Landrette v. Bristol, 1279 CRB-6-91-8 (August 19, 1993), infra, distinguished. Trier did not find that misdiagnosis had occurred. Claim for § 7-433c benefits was not preserved by 1996 medical treatment, as it was not established that medical care was provided for heart disease symptoms, nor was it preserved by the June 2001 notice, which was untimely on its face. DISSENT (Vargas): Respondents provided medical treatment because claimant’s symptoms included anginal pain, and misdiagnosis should toll statute of limitations. Also cited at Carter, § 7-433c, § 31-301-4 (Motions to Correct).

Correction Officer asserted that hypertension and cardiac disease the result of job induced stress. Trial commissioner determined claim was for single injury but was untimely, as Form 30C asserted a date of injury more than one year prior to date of filing. Claimant appealed dismissal. CRB remanded matter. Evidence on record demonstrated that claimant was also seeking recovery based on a repetitive trauma theory, and respondents challenged this argument; therefore, no prejudice to respondent. Discussion of Chappell v. Pfizer, Inc., 5139 CRB-2-06-10 (November 19, 2007), aff’d, 115 Conn. App. 702 (2009) and Discuillo v. Stone & Webster, 242 Conn. 570 (1997) regarding lacuna in statute regarding filing repetitive trauma claims. Trial commissioner erred by not considering repetitive trauma theory, remand required to ascertain last date of exposure to ascertain if claim was timely. Respondent’s reliance on Arborio v. Windham Police Department, 103 Conn. App. 172 (2007) and Chernak v. Stamford-Police Department, 5012 CRB-7-05-10 (December 13, 2006) misplaced; standard for § 7-433c different than repetitive trauma.

Trooper died at home. Claim later filed in name of “Robert Berry, Deceased.” Respondents later challenged jurisdiction, asserting claim was inadequate as per Kuehl v. Z-Loda Systems Engineering, 265 Conn. 525 (2003). Trial commissioner dismissed claim on jurisdictional grounds. CRB reversed on appeal. Kuehl only applies when they is no claim; here factual scenario clearly put respondent on notice as to § 31-306 claim. Tardy v. Abington Constructors, Inc., 4105 CRB-2-99-8 (October 30, 2000), aff’d, 71 Conn. App. 140 (2002) on point; strict compliance not required as long as respondent is placed on notice. See also Berry, § 31-306, § 31-301. Appeal procedure; § 31-301-4.

Claimant alleged she filed Form 30C first with employer, then later filed Form 30C with Commission. On appeal, she sought to obtain admission of late evidence and award of attorney’s fees for alleged defective disclaimer from respondent. CRB denied, citing Pantanella v. Enfield Ford, 65 Conn. App. 46 (2001); document sought to be admitted (first 30C form) available to claimant before hearing and had no legal significance as it had not been filed with Commission. See, Christy, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301 Appeal procedure, § 31-300, § 31-307.

Chappell v. Pfizer, Inc., 5139 CRB-2-06-10 (November 19, 2007), aff’d, 115 Conn. App. 702 (2009).

Claimant asserted he had contracted asthma by inhaling fumes from fermentation tank at pharmaceutical plant. Claim was not brought within one year period from date of last exposure. Respondents challenged claim as untimely as claim beyond timeline for accidental injury or repetitive trauma claims. Trial commissioner found claimant proved an occupational disease claim, thus making claim timely. Respondents appealed, but CRB upheld award. See also, Chappell, § 31-275(15).

Trial commissioner found that claimant was obligated to treat for previous compensable injuries, thus injury en route to such treatment met the “mutual benefit” test. CRB upheld. See also Houlihan, § 31-275(1), § 31-301. Factual findings.

Claimant asserted that respondent’s medical care plan (see Sec. 31-279(c)) had treated a work-related injury prior to her filing an admittedly late Form 30c. Respondents denied she satisfied “medical care exception”. Trial commissioner dismissed claim without obtaining testimony from witnesses or obtaining exhibits. Claimant appealed. CRB remanded matter for evidentiary hearing, as “the record is inadequate.” Bennett v. Wal-Mart Stores, 4939 CRB-7-05-5 (May 15, 2006). Commissioner should have obtained evidence as to jurisdictional facts prior to reaching decision as to jurisdiction. See also, Caraballo, § 31-279(c)), § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Respondents need not file Form 43 to contest issues related to extent of disability, where compensability was not in dispute, and written notice of claim was not filed until claimant had been furnished with medical care and was back at work. Where report attached to voluntary agreement on permanency made oblique reference to possible future back injury exacerbations, and a subsequent letter clarified that claimant would be prone to flare-ups due to compensable injury, the contents of that report did not preclude respondents from challenging future medical treatment for exacerbations. See Liebel, § 31-294d, § 31-295, 31-300, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-312; also cited at Liebel, § 31-278, § 31-298, § 31-307.

Claimant alleges lumbar disc injury was due to fall at employer’s office. Record reflects lapse of time from date of injury to notification of physician as to injury. Claimant filed timely Form 30C, but respondent’s Form 43 was untimely. Trial commissioner granted Motion to Preclude but dismissed claim for medical treatment and disability, determining claimant’s evidence was not credible. Claimant appealed and CRB upheld dismissal. Case is identical to Tucker v. Connecticut Winpump, Inc., 4492 CRB-5-02-2 (February 21, 2003); Public Act 93-228 § 8 specifically allows respondent to contest disability. As per Wierzbicki v. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 4147 CRB-1-99-11 (December 19, 2000), trial commissioner was not persuaded by claimant’s evidence and this determination cannot be reversed on appeal. Supreme Court reversed. Supreme Court held “once a motion to preclude is granted, the only role an employer plays is to decide whether to stipulate to the compensation claim. If the employer does not so stipulate, the claimant proceeds with her case, subject to the examination by the commissioner.” See Harpaz v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 286 Conn. 102 (2008).

Surviving spouse filed a § 31-306 action against decedent’s employer and served claim on employer. Respondents failed to contest claim within statutory period and trial commissioner granted claimant’s Motion to Preclude over respondent’s objection; who argued service had to be on respondent’s legal counsel. CRB upheld trial commissioner. Respondent’s reliance on Schreck v. Stamford, 250 Conn. 592 (1999) is misplaced; that case was an appeal; not a claim for § 31-306 benefits or a claim commenced under § 31-294c(a). As per Tardy v. Abington Constructors, Inc., 71 Conn. App. 140 (2002) § 31-306 actions are new claims. CRB Precedent regarding § 31-294c(a) distinguishes service requirements for new claims from service requirements for appeals. Service on employer’s place of business engages commission’s jurisdiction. See also, Gorman, § 31-306.

Claimant filed Form 30C asserting compensable back injury; respondent’s Form 43 filed after statutory deadline. Motion to Preclude granted on issue of compensability. Claimant then sought to find later back surgery as sequela of compensable injury. Trial commissioner found respondent’s expert witness more persuasive and dismissed claim for surgery as claimant failed to prove causation. On appeal, CRB upheld trial commissioner. Case follows Tucker v. Connecticut Winpump, 4492 CRB 5-02-2 (February 21, 2003); claimant must prove causal connection, as respondent may always contest extent of disability.

Sole proprietor commenced claim by filing Form 30C with commission and with himself as employer. He did not provide notice of claim to insurance carrier. After 28 days, he filed a Motion to Preclude, arguing that a timely Form 43 had not been filed. Insurance carrier filed Form 43 and challenged preclusion. Trial commissioner granted motion on the basis that although claimant’s actions were “underhanded,” disclaimer was late and applicable case law made this an issue of insurance coverage beyond scope of the Commission. CRB upheld on appeal. Commission is limited to “plain meaning” of statutes, and there is no mention of “insurer” in § 31-294c, unlike § 31-287 and § 31-341. The Act presumes the insurer has the same knowledge of an injury as the employer and only requires an insurer to be notified as to hearings, not claims. Statute places sole burden to defend claim on employer, and for sole proprietors a statutory loophole exists that would have to be rectified by General Assembly. Dissent (Vargas): Motion to Preclude should be vacated, as claimant’s manufactured compensability constitutes the sort of misrepresentation or artifice which cannot be condoned. See Mankus v. Robert Mankus, 4958 CRB-1-05-6 (August 22, 2006). “Plain meaning” rule does not require CRB to endorse a result such as that which occurred in this case.

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s conclusion that notice of claim for bilateral knee injuries attributable to repetitive trauma was timely filed despite claimant’s surgeries years earlier. Medical evidence showed continued exposure to repetitive trauma following surgery worsened claimant’s knees.

Claimant listed date of accidental injury (exposure to contagious disease) as “Sometime between Approximately 01/02/2001 � 12/20/2001.” Form 30C was filed May 2, 2002. Form 43 allegedly filed 6/5/02. Board affirmed trial commissioner’s denial of Motion to Preclude. Commission had jurisdiction to consider claim, as defect in notice does not bar recovery. Employer would instead be given allowance for prejudice caused by imprecise description of date of injury. However, Commission would not have jurisdiction over dates of injury occurring more than one year prior to filing of Form 30C. CRB also has subject matter jurisdiction to consider appeal from denial of Motion to Preclude, as such motion is recognized by Admin. Reg. § 31-297(b)-1. Employer was excused from filing disclaimer within 28-day period, as one-year date range in notice describes broad time period with many possible mechanisms for exposure to disease. Notice not specific enough to enable prompt investigation. Also cited at Austin, § 31-278, § 31-301. Appeal procedure. Prior decision at Austin, infra.

Trial Commissioner denied Motion to Preclude in response to disclaimer for a § 31-306 claim that (a) was addressed to decedent, and (b) failed to include a checked box regarding nature of defense. CRB affirmed trial commissioner. CRB found precedent in Walter v. State, 63 Conn. App. 1 (2001) and Augeri v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 3591 CRB-8-97-4 (June 3, 1998) dispositive of issues related to service of the disclaimer. CRB found verbiage in disclaimer as to grounds of defense indistinguishable from Tovish v. Gerber Electronics, 19 Conn. App. 273 (1989). Absence of checked box harmless error. Read as a whole, disclaimer clearly contests compensability of claimant’s injury and explains nature of defense.

Claimant asserted he had suffered a work related injury to his right shoulder. Record indicated he had not filed claim within one year of alleged date of injury. Record also did not reflect that medical care had been provided for shoulder injury within one year of date of accident, as required under § 31-294d. Trier properly dismissed claim as lacking jurisdiction. See also, Horvath, § 31-294d, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Commission lacked jurisdiction over § 31-306 claim when notice of claim for Chapter 568 benefits was not filed until after employee’s death, and years after claim would have accrued. Notice filed under federal Longshore Act two decades earlier inadequate as per precedent in Buck v. General Dynamics Corp./Electric Boat Division, 3324 CRB-2-96-4 (January 21, 1998). Stare decisis requires that commissioner’s dismissal be upheld. See also, Chambers, § 31-278, § 31-306.

Claimant filed Form 30C stating place of injury was “Belchertown, MA.” Employer did not file a timely disclaimer and took position notice was inadequate. Trial commissioner granted claimant’s Motion to Preclude. CRB upheld trial commissioner. Legal precedent unsupportive of strict compliance standard for notice. In addition, respondents should not have had difficulty investigating claim based on facts in the record, including limited number of possible locations of injury.

Police officer who received award under Gartrell precedent for mental injury following a physical injury appealed denial of pre-accident PTSD claims. CRB upheld trial commissioner. Claimant failed to file notice of claim for mental injuries prior to effective date of Public Act 93-228, § 1 under any applicable statute of limitations. Commission lacks jurisdiction over stale claims. See also, Villemaire, § 3-275(16), § 31-301. Factual findings.

Duglenski v. Waterbury, 4913 CRB-5-05-2 (January 18, 2006), dismissed for lack of final judgment/lack of jurisdiction, A.C. 27333 (June 8, 2006).

CRB found error in granting of motion to preclude. Claimant had filed two Forms 30C listing the same body part (cardiovascular system) but different injury types (one listed April 29, 2003 as a specific date of injury, while the other listed the time period March 1, 1987 through April 29, 2003). Respondent replied with a single Form 43 contesting a condition of hypertension or cardiovascular disease, which used the April 29, 2003 injury date. Trier found that the repetitive trauma claim was not addressed by the Form 43. CRB held that a reasonable person reading the Form 43 would understand that the respondent was challenging both claims for a cardiovascular condition pursuant to § 7-433c or chapter 568, considering the unambiguous language used in the reasons for contest.

Dependent spouse sought § 31-306 benefits. CRB applied precedent in Mingrone, 1403 CRB-7-92-3 (January 13, 1994) to determine that claim is timely if decedent dies more than two years after manifestation of illness when the claim is brought less than one year after death of decedent and less that three years after manifestation of illness. See also, Fredette, § 31-310.

CRB remanded commissioner’s ruling granting of claimant’s motion to preclude for finding as to whether the claims were timely filed pursuant to § 31-294c. Without such a finding the commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction and once raised must be determined.

Notice of claim for dependent death benefits was untimely, as Form 30C was filed more than three years after first manifestation of symptom of occupational disease. CRB concluded that three-year notice period is triggered when symptom of disease is, or should have been, recognized by claimant, irrespective of whether causal connection has been drawn between disease and employment. Supreme Court transferred case to itself under P.B. § 65-1 and reversed CRB decision, holding that “occupational disease” requires proof of causal connection between employment and disease, and “manifestation of symptom” definition under § 31-294c(a) requires awareness of causal connection to employment before limitations period commences. Court extensively discussed Bremner v. Eidlitz & Son, Inc., 118 Conn. 666 (1934), which recognized this knowledge component, and created foundation for subsequent statutory language and interpretive caselaw.

When jurisdictional question arose relating to the dependent spouse’s claim following the close of the record and before a decision was rendered, the granting of claimant’s motion to present additional evidence was not an abuse of the trier’s discretion. See also, Berry, § 31-315.

CRB remanded case to trial commissioner in order to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists prior to ruling on motion to preclude.

Hallock v. Westport, 4829 CRB-4-04-7 (July 22, 2005), appeal dismissed, A.C. 26823 (September 26, 2006).

Claimant filed § 7-433c claim for coronary artery disease following a June 12, 2002 myocardial infarction. Respondent contested claim based on 140/88 blood pressure reading from 1991 that was characterized as “mild hypertension” by examining physician, and on doctor’s repeated advice that claimant stop smoking and undergo stress test. Claimant was not prescribed medication, nor was he diagnosed with heart disease. Trier found that claimant’s borderline blood pressure reading in 1991 was an isolated event, and statute of limitations for filing hypertension or heart disease claim was not triggered before 2002. Held: no error. Notation of “mild hypertension” was not tantamount to diagnosis of hypertension or heart disease, and trier expressly declined to find that physician conveyed finding of mild hypertension to claimant. Testimony of claimant, claimant’s wife, and physician supported trier’s findings. Also, case law supports finding that single borderline high blood pressure reading need not constitute manifestation of hypertension. See also, Hallock, § 31-294e, § 7-433c.

Claimant filed Form 30C for repetitive trauma injury (tennis elbow) caused by continuing work activities from 1989 forward. Notice listed date of injury as February 15, 2002. Travelers was on risk as compensation insurer from August 2002-August 2003. Claimant continued to work for employer through date of formal hearing. Trier ordered Travelers to assume responsibility for repetitive trauma claim. Travelers argued on appeal that sufficient notice was not given for repetitive trauma injury within its coverage period. CRB affirmed finding of trial commissioner. Evidence showed that period of repetitive trauma was equal to entire period of employment through date of formal hearing. Counsel had represented Travelers at formal hearing, and Travelers was noticed of deposition of treating physician. No deprivation of due process, as Travelers had actual notice that its period of coverage was implicated in this claim, and it was not prejudiced by inaccuracy in written notice. Claimant does not bear burden to file additional notices of repetitive trauma based on employer’s subsequent decision to purchase insurance with another provider. See also, Rodriguez-Colon, § 31-299b, § 31-298, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Dependent spouse sought § 31-306 benefits. Claim found untimely under § 31-294c(a) where decedent died Aug. 3, 1995 and claimant learned of causal relationship between decedent’s death and employment on May 6, 1996 but did not file a written notice of claim until May 26, 1998, more than 2 years from the date of the claimant’s knowledge as to the first manifestation of symptom. See also, Stevenson, 4480 CRB-8-02-1 (January 3, 2003), infra.

CRB affirmed trier’s factual determination that the Notice of Claim was untimely and did not meet the medical care exception. Claimant had no expectation of medical care from nurse whose only duty was to fill out injury report. Furthermore, there was no evidence the respondent-employer was aware the injury took place where injury report could not be located and claimant should have forwarded such to his superior. See also, DelConte, § 31-301-9.

CRB affirmed ruling respondent received constructive notice of claim within one year based on claimant’s medical treatment, completion of First Report of Injury, and respondent’s payment for medical treatment. See also, Distassio § 31-301. Factual findings.

Panasci v. Waterbury, 4666 CRB-5-03-5 (March 29, 2004), appeal dismissed, A.C. 25329 (July 21, 2004).

Respondent’s Form 43 that specifically contested an element of the claimant’s prima facie case was held to be sufficient to withstand the Motion to Preclude.

Harkins v. State/DMR, 4650 CRB-5-03-3 (March 4, 2004), appeal dismissed for lack of final judgment, A.C. 25256 (September 14, 2004).

CRB affirmed trier’s ruling denying claimant’s Motion to Preclude. Respondent’s disclaimer language was sufficiently specific.

CRB remanded dismissal of claim for head/traumatic brain injury claimant alleged occurred on the same date as original leg injury. Once trial commissioner determined leg injury was compensable, no additional notice of claim was necessary for the head/traumatic brain injury. See also, Scott § 31-284b.

Hunt v. Naugatuck, 4607 CRB-5-02-12 (February 9, 2004), appeal dismissed for lack of final judgment, A.C. 25129 (April 21, 2004), cert. granted, 269 Conn. 916 (2004), rev’d and remanded Appellate Court’s dismissal for lack of final judgment, 273 Conn. 97 (2005).

CRB held incorrect date of injury on Notice of Claim a defect rather than bar to the claim. Informal hearings held within one year of date of injury provided respondents with constructive notice of claim. Supreme Court reversed Appellate Court on lack of final judgment issue only and remanded case to Appellate court to review substance of appeallate issues. Supreme Court reversed Appellate Court on lack of final judgment issue only and remanded case to Appellate court to review substance of appellate issues. See also, Hunt §§ 7-433a, 7-433b & 7-433c.

Motion to Preclude is used to challenge a respondent’s right to contest liability. Failure to file a timely Form 43 does not preclude respondent from contesting extent of the disability. See also, Paige, §§ 31-298, 31-301. Factual findings.

CRB affirmed trier’s dismissal of claimant’s repetitive trauma claim filed in excess of one year from last date of employment where none of the statutory exceptions set forth in § 31-294c(a) were met. See prior decision at Conerly, 4567 CRB-7-02-9 (November 17, 2002). See also, Conerly, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s determination that notice of claim for repetitive emotional stress was untimely. Commissioner based his decision in finding the last date claimant actually performed job duties was February 15, 1999, triggering the one year notice period for repetitive trauma injuries; notice was not filed until February 16, 2000. Although claimant appeared at his place of employment after February 15, 1999, he performed no job duties on those dates that could have exposed him to occupational stress as to extend the notice period.

West v. Heitkamp, Inc., 4587 CRB-5-02-11 (October 27, 2003), appeal dismissed for lack of final judgment, A.C. 24805 (February 11, 2004).

Trier erred by granting Motion to Preclude where respondents listed correct date of injury and body part, and stated that “alleged injury did not occur in the course and scope of employment.” Notice was sufficient to inform claimant of specific basis for contest.

CRB affirmed trier’s denial of claimant’s Motion to Preclude where claimant failed to file a written notice of claim consistent with § 31-321. Respondents furnishing of medical care does not satisfy the legal prerequisites for precluding the respondents from asserting a defense to a particular body part.

Where insurer had unwittingly processed two years’ worth of prescription medications for hypertension, trier found that “medical care” exception in § 31-294c(c) was satisfied. CRB affirmed. Medical evidence showed that hypertension was related to underlying chest injury that had already been accepted by respondents, so no separate notice of claim was necessary. Moreover, submission of prescriptions to workers’ compensation insurer was sufficient to qualify under medical care exception. Insurer could have learned that it was paying for hypertension medication had it carefully checked documents submitted by claimant. See also, Carlson, § 31-301-9.

CRB affirmed trier’s conclusion that the claimant did not carry his burden of proof as to whether the employer furnished medical care for an injury to claimant’s mouth that he alleged occurred some 13 years prior. The constructive notice provision of § 31-294c(c) obviating the need for a written notice of claim is not satisfied where the medical care provided at the time of alleged injury is not such that the employer would know that the injury may be the basis of a workers’ compensation claim. See also, Salerno, § 31-301. Factual findings.

CRB affirmed trier’s ruling that dependent spouse’s claim was untimely under § 31-294c(a), which states that where death of decedent occurs within two years of date of accident or first manifestation of symptom of occupational disease, notice must be filed within two-year period or one year from date of death, whichever is later. Board concluded that the language of the statute was not ambiguous and thus, must be applied as written. See also, Bartlett, § 31-306.

See, Bastek, § 31-301. Factual findings (imprecise finding as to date of injury did not require dismissal, nor did respondents allege prejudice).

CRB affirmed trier’s findings and conclusion that claimant’s frequent treatment for back ailments with employer’s on-site medical facility failed to satisfy medical treatment exception in § 31-294c(c). Claim was for repetitive trauma spanning 1959-1991, while last date of treatment was 1983, and last mention of possible work connection between back injury and employment was 1972. (Miles, C., DISSENTING)(remand for articulation would be best, as evidence shows claimant received medical treatment for back pain due to heavy work of same sort that substantially factored into causing current back condition).

It was within trier’s power to find that claimant’s lung condition was not attributable to compensable injury, even though respondents were precluded from contesting compensability by virtue of having failed to contest liability or to begin making payments within 28 days. Barron v. City Printing Co., 55 Conn. App. 85 (1999), distinguished.

Claimant was the dependent spouse of decedent, and sought benefits pursuant to § 31-306 due to husband’s death on August 13, 1995 as a result of asbestosis. Trier assumed for sake of argument that first manifestation of symptoms occurred May 6, 1996; as claim was not filed until May 26, 1998, it was untimely. CRB remanded for a determination of the date of first manifestation, as trier’s assumption regarding that material fact was inappropriate. See also, Stevenson, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-306. Subsequent decision, Stevenson, 4710 CRB-5-03-8 (December 17, 2004), supra.

Insufficient evidence to show that claimant was incapacitated and incompetent to file claim at the time one-year anniversary of last date of exposure to repetitive trauma elapsed. Further, no authority cited in support of proposition that Commission’s jurisdiction can be expanded beyond one-year limit where claimant is legally incapacitated during last several days of notice period. See also, Malchik, § 31-275(9), § 31-275(15).

Claimant’s death occurred within two years of last date of employment, so counsel raised argument (on appeal) that claim for HIV exposure should be deemed timely. Aside from fact that this argument was not made at trial, or in claimant’s brief, thus making it a poor candidate for review, CRB noted that use of “accidental injury” theory of Doe v. Stamford, 241 Conn. 692 (1997) to show infectious HIV exposure would be problematic due to long incubation period of virus and claimant’s manifestation of symptoms more than two years before HIV was finally diagnosed and claim was filed. Supreme Court reversed CRB’s dismissal of appeal on ground that HIV constituted occupational disease (with three-year statute of limitations for filing). See also Doe, § 31-275(15), § 31-275(16).

CRB affirmed trier’s granting of Motion to Preclude where employer did not receive certified letter containing Form 30C despite five delivery attempts by post office. Though sufficiency of claim notice to trigger employer’s investigative responsibilities is a legal question, factual inferences may be drawn concerning procedures that were followed in attempting delivery of certified letter. Evidence indicated that absence of numbered street address on envelope did not affect post office’s attempts to deliver letter to restaurant. CRB distinguished Kudlacz v. Lindberg Heat Treating Co., 250 Conn. 581 (1999) [see § 31-301. Appeal procedure] and similar cases, as policy behind preclusion statute differs from that regarding rights of appeal, and no showing was made that restaurant was not at fault for failure to receive letter. Claimant need only demonstrate that adequate Form 30C had been sent by certified mail to employer’s place of business in order to satisfy general notice requirements of § 31-321. See also, Morgan, § 31-321.

Board affirmed trier’s conclusion that claim was not time barred. Trier had discretion to decide that employer’s provision of a back brace satisfied medical care exception of § 31-294c(c) under these circumstances, including that it was given to claimant under auspices of a supervisor and registered nurse, that her use of the brace was monitored, and that employer had notice of injury.

See, Mason, § 31-284(a) (intoxication defense does not involve subject matter jurisdiction, and cannot be raised or precluded before existence of employment relationship is decided). See also, Mason, § 31-298, § 31-301. Appeal procedure. Subsequent decision at Mason, 4476 CRB-3-01-2 (April 28, 2003).

CRB affirmed trier’s decision to grant motion to preclude. Respondents did not raise jurisdictional issue by arguing claimant was performing an errand for a second employer during her lunch break, which is when her claimed accident and injury occurred. No dispute that there was an existing employer-employee relationship between the parties at the time of the injury; rather, it was a dispute over causal connection, which is not a jurisdictional matter under Del Toro v. Stamford, 64 Conn. App. 1 (2001). Also, initial notice of claim was not legally defective, and respondents’ duty to respond to claim was triggered.

CRB affirmed trier’s ruling that surviving spouse’s September 1997 notice of claim was timely, following her late husband’s heart attack and death on November 29, 1995. Claimant had two years from date of injury/death to file her notice under the plain language of § 31-294c(a). Construction of statute by reference to legislative history was unnecessary, as no exception is made for death that occurs on same day as injury itself.

Claimant, a landscaper, allegedly contracted Lyme Disease from tick bite during his employment sometime before May 17, 1994. Lyme Disease symptoms were claimed prior to that date, but claimant could not specifically recall a previous tick bite. Doctors noted symptoms that appeared to be consistent with Lyme Disease, and opined that illness was related to employment. Respondents initially contested injury on grounds that “The claimant’s Lyme Disease did not occur in and out of the course of employment” and “no medical substantiation to prove work injury.” Four years later, independent medical examiner opined that claimant did not have Lyme Disease. Claimant moved to preclude respondents from raising this defense. Trier denied this motion, and relied on doctor’s opinion in holding that claimant had failed to prove that he had Lyme Disease, or that he had been infected by a deer tick. CRB affirmed. Respondents validly contested claim under § 31-294c, and listed defenses placing claimant on notice that he would need medical evidence showing that he (a) had Lyme Disease (b) which was causally connected to workplace tick bites. Although respondents deserved criticism for waiting four years to actively contest, claimant still retained burden of proving that he had a compensable illness in the first place. See also, Kuba, § 31-298.

CRB affirmed granting of Motion to Preclude where Form 30C was sent via certified mail to employer’s house rather than to post office box, and was enclosed in envelope with return address of claimant’s doctor. Notice substantially complied with requirements of § 31-294c(a). Parties adequately adhered to Admin. Reg. § 31-297(b)-1 in presenting and defending Motion to Preclude.

Board affirmed trier’s determination that dependent widow failed to file timely notice of claim for benefits as required by § 31-294c. Whether respondents’ pleadings in third party lawsuit demonstrated substantial compliance with notice requirements of § 31-294c was a factual issue. Additionally, board was unpersuaded by claimant’s argument that her knowledge of husband’s death and of potential claim for widow’s benefits should be imputed to employer and insurer on basis that claimant widow ran day-to-day operations of the respondent employer business. See also, Kuehl, § 31-306.

Board briefly addressed claimant’s contention that respondents waived right to deny compensability of his knee injury pursuant to § 31-294c(c) because they paid medical bills and temporary total disability benefits after his surgery. Board explained that reliance upon § 31-294c(c) was misplaced, as it is a “savings provision” that aids claimants by allowing for alternatives to strict requirement that written notice of claim be filed within one year of accidental injury or three years of occupational disease. Board noted that claimant did not argue that respondents were precluded from defending claim pursuant to § 31-294c(b), presumably because he did not file timely written notice of claim for knee injury. See also, Christoforo, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301-4.

Trier concluded that claimant failed to provide timely notice pursuant to § 31-294c in re: left knee injury of December 22, 1997, as notice of claim incorrectly listed December 29, 1997 as date of injury. The claimant contended on appeal that he provided timely notice under § 31-294c(c), with its defect being harmless because respondents alleged no prejudice due to incorrect date. Board explained that one-year statute of limitations would be satisfied if the incorrect date were construed as a “defect or inaccuracy” under § 31-294c(c) rather than an invalidation of notice. Therefore, board remanded matter for trier to address the statutory provision that inaccuracy in a notice of claim shall not bar proceedings “unless the employer shows that he was ignorant of the facts concerning the personal injury and was prejudiced by the defect or inaccuracy of the notice�.”

CRB affirmed trier’s granting of Motion to Preclude. Respondents were unable to authenticate Form 43 sufficiently to get it into evidence at trial, and without it, Form 30C was not properly challenged. Confusion regarding date of injury did not render notice insufficient to support preclusion, as trier accepted claimant’s testimony that accidental injury occurred on the date alleged by the claimant�which was the same date cited in the notice of claim. See also, Scott, § 31-301-9.

See, Kelley, § 31-278 (Motion to Preclude denied and case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction), § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

One-year notice period from last date of employment or exposure to incidents of repetitive trauma applied, as claimant’s heart condition was reasonably found to be attributable to workplace activities. Description of injury as “heart and hypertension” resulting from repetitive trauma rather than “progression of heart and hypertension” due to repetitive trauma is not a significant distinction, and does not amount to a prejudicial defect in notice. See also, Bond, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Maginnis v. U.S. Airways, 4116 CRB-1-99-8 (February 21, 2001), appeal dismissed, A.C. 21666 (March 28, 2001).

Board affirmed trier’s dismissal of claim as untimely, where trier disagreed that hearing loss constituted an occupational disease and thus applied one-year statute of limitations. CRB noted that in Discuillo v. Stone & Webster, 242 Conn. 570, 579 (1997), it was stressed that repetitive trauma injuries are not automatically categorized as “accidental injuries” rather than “occupational diseases” for purposes of determining jurisdiction under § 31-294c, and that trier must make factual determination as to whether a repetitive trauma injury should be treated as an occupational disease for jurisdictional purposes. The trier below did precisely that when he considered, but was not persuaded by, evidence presented by claimant that his hearing loss should be deemed an occupational disease.

Board affirmed trier’s determination that claimant did not file timely notice of claim for a 1993 injury, and did not satisfy medical care exception. Claimant argued that respondent provided medical care for his injury. However, fact-finder determined that this medical care was for a separate compensable injury, and that respondent did not have knowledge of alleged 1993 injury. Existence of medical care exception is based upon premise that, if employer furnishes medical treatment, it must know that an injury has been suffered which might be the basis of a workers’ compensation claim.

Where claimant failed to file a written Form 30C, she could not attempt to invoke preclusion remedy in § 31-294c(b). See also, Wierzbicki, § 31-300, § 31-307.

CRB affirmed decision of trial commissioner granting Motion to Preclude. Notice provisions of § 31-294c apply to dependents seeking benefits following death of claimant whose compensation claim has been previously accepted. Both case law and language of § 31-306b favor separate notice requirements. Thus, respondents are required to file notice of intention to contest liability. Here, absence of place of death and inclusion of claimant’s name and date of original injury were consistent with the instructions on the Form 30C, and did not constitute significant inaccuracies that would prevent triggering of obligation to file disclaimer. Respondents could have timely investigated claim based on information in Form 30C. CRB also affirmed trier’s conclusion that claimant’s attorney did not “fish for preclusion” by misleading respondent insurer into believing no claim had been filed, and rejected respondents’ argument that the Form 36 they filed to discontinue total disability benefits following the decedent’s death operated jointly as a notice of intention to contest liability under § 31-294c(b). See also, Tardy, § 31-306.

CRB affirmed trier’s conclusion that claimant failed to provide sufficient notice of knee injury claim where his notice listed as the date of injury the date of a prior compensable injury that had occurred nine years prior. Even under the totality of the circumstances, claimant’s notice did not “substantially comply” with the notice content requirements of § 31-294c. Specifically, claimant’s incident report (filed on the date of the alleged injury) did not in any manner indicate that he intended to file a workers’ compensation claim for this injury.

CRB affirmed the trier’s granting of the claimant’s Motion to Preclude. Notice of claim listed the date of diagnosis of the decedent’s pancreatic cancer, which was alleged to be an occupational disease on said notice. The claimant had stopped working for the respondent employer two days prior. Respondents were incorrect in their argument that the claimant had to prove causation in order for preclusion to lie.

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s decision to grant Motion to Preclude. Description of injury as “Fibromyalgia/Myofacial pain due to repetitive nature of job” provided employer with sufficient information to trigger investigative responsibilities. A specific body part did not have to be cited in lieu of the illness itself, given the nature of claimant’s condition.

CRB affirmed trier’s granting of Motion to Preclude respondents from contesting compensability. Notice of claim satisfied the requirements of § 31-294c(a), triggering respondents’ obligation to file a timely disclaimer. Delivery of letter to corporate headquarters’ payroll office was proper under § 31-321, and letter contained essence of warning to employer that preclusion would result if it did not file a notice of contest within 28 days.

Insurer did not waive defense that no policy was in effect with the employer on the date of injury by failing to clearly mention that issue in its Form 43, as notice of intent to contest liability is intended to apprise claimant of employer’s reasons for contest. See also, DiBello, § 31-278, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301-9, § 31-348. Subsequent decision at DiBello, 4290 CRB-7-00-9 (September 25, 2001), § 31-300, § 31-308a.

Trier determined on remand that claimant’s right and left hand injuries arose from the same repetitive trauma that had caused an earlier right thumb injury, which was an accepted claim. Absence of timely notice for later injuries thus not fatal to case, as separate notice was unnecessary for those injuries. Respondents’ issues on appeal were essentially raised in prior Khazzaka decision, 3508 CRB-5-96-12 (May 26, 1998) (cited infra), and CRB declined to readdress them.

CRB reversed trier’s granting of Motion to Preclude where notice of claim alleged a mental injury, but alleged no physical injury. Board held that trial commissioner lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the alleged injury was excluded from the definition of personal injury under the Act. See also, Reaves, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Del Toro v. Stamford, 3731 CRB-7-97-11 (October 22, 1999), rev’d, 64 Conn. App. 1 (2001), cert. denied, 258 Conn. 913 (2001).

Claimant alleged repetitive trauma injury with July 1995 date of injury, and described injury as “officer injured shooting 11-30-85.” Respondents failed to file timely disclaimer. Trier denied Motion to Preclude on ground that notice did not allege a compensable injury under § 31-275(16)(B)(ii), which excludes mental and emotional impairments from definition of personal injury unless they arise from physical trauma or occupational disease. CRB affirmed. Following Supreme Court ruling in Biasetti v. Stamford, 250 Conn. 65 (1999), under § 31-275(16)(B)(ii) no remedy lies within the Workers’ Compensation Act for emotional or mental impairment unless it arises from a personal injury or occupational disease. Biasetti is factually indistinguishable from this matter and thus there is no subject matter jurisdiction. (Delaney, C., CONCURRING) Binding precedent requires affirmance, but Supreme Court’s ruling in Biasetti is disturbing. (Miles, C. DISSENTING) Supreme Court’s ruling in Biasetti runs afoul of purpose of Act. Claimant’s notice did not exclude physical injury as cause of stress claim on its face, thereby triggering employer’s obligation to file disclaimer. Ambiguity must be resolved in claimant’s favor. Appellate Court ruled that motion to preclude should have been granted, as compensability of an injury under § 31-275(16)(B)(ii) does not implicate this Commission’s subject matter jurisdiction over a claim. See also, § 31-275(16). This holding was reversed following CRB’s Subsequent decision at Del Toro, 4515 CRB-7-02-4 (March 31, 2003), motion for summary affirmance granted, (A.C. 24150)(July 10, 2003), rev’d, 270 Conn. 532 (2004), § 31-278, also cited at Del Toro, § 31-275(16). Supreme Court held that a claimed injury must fall within scope of definition of “personal injury” under Act in order for trial commissioner to have subject matter jurisdiction over claim.

Pernacchio v. New Haven, 3911 CRB-3-98-10 (September 27, 1999), aff’d, 63 Conn. App. 570 (2001).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s conclusion that claimant provided timely notice of hypertension claim, even though he did not file a timely Form 30C. Specifically, the claimant’s First Report of Injury and the employer’s investigation form drafted in response thereto were adequate to fulfill the notice requirements set forth in § 31-294c. Medical care exception was met where employer’s paramedic took claimant’s blood pressure and accompanied him to hospital in employer’s emergency vehicle.

Respondents accepted back injury caused by a 1993 assault on claimant, but contested alleged foot injury. Trier found foot injury compensable. In support of appeal, respondents argued that claimant did not file a timely notice of claim for his foot injury. Board explained that a claimant who provides timely written notice of claim is not required to file a second notice of claim for another injury that arose from the same incident. Case remanded to trial commissioner for findings regarding initial notice of claim.

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s conclusion that claimant failed to file timely notice of claim for upper respiratory condition which was allegedly caused by airborne particles at work. Trier found that claimant’s condition did not constitute an occupational disease, and thus, in order to be timely, notice of claim had to have been filed within one year following last date of injurious exposure. See also, Ryan, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Claimant, a prison guard, was cursorily examined by on-site medic following attack by inmate. Employer supplied her with information regarding a peer counseling session that was offered to all employees who were involved in inmate-related incidents. Claimant participated in that meeting, and expressed her belief that by doing so, she was receiving medical care. Trier found that totality of these circumstances satisfied the medical care exception to late notice in § 31-294c(c). CRB reversed and remanded, explaining that the direct or indirect participation of a physician is necessary because such care is required by § 31-294d. Claimant’s perception of the nature of her treatment is immaterial given that the statute specifically defines “medical treatment.” Trier did not state whether a physician either participated in or supervised the initial treatment or the group counseling session, so CRB remanded for further findings.

See, King, § 7-433c, § 31-284(a).

Nurse instructed claimant to seek medical attention after he complained of chest pain at work. Doctor at hospital diagnosed dyspepsia. Eight days later, claimant had myocardial infarction. Trier found that first incident was manifestation of coronary insufficiency rather than dyspepsia in accordance with medical report, and held that claimant met medical care exception of § 31-294c(c). CRB affirmed. Case similar to Gesmundo v. Bush, 133 Conn. 607 (1947); trier had reasonable basis upon which to conclude that respondent was aware of claimant’s condition and the possibility that he would file a workers’ compensation claim. See also, Horn, § 5-145a (remanded). Subsequent decision at Horn, 4177 CRB-3-00-1 (February 22, 2001), supra, § 5-145a, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Trial commissioner found claimant’s cryptococcal meningitis was contracted during the course of his employment, and ruled claim compensable. CRB held that medical reports supported factual finding that, within a reasonable degree of medical probability, the claimant’s exposure to pigeon droppings at work caused him to become infected with the fungus. However, CRB remanded case for further findings regarding notice, as trial commissioner did not specify whether this condition constituted an accidental injury or an occupational disease for purposes of notice under § 31-294c. See also, Pekar, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Claimant was exposed to asbestos from 1950 until he retired in 1987. Claimant was diagnosed with asbestosis prior to 1987, but never missed any time from work due to asbestosis. CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s conclusion that the claimant’s date of injury for purposes of § 31-294c was November 27, 1997, the date on which there was sufficient medical evidence to establish asbestosis. However, the relevant date for purposes of calculating the claimant’s weekly benefit rate hinges on incapacity rather than diagnosis, and thus the CRB remanded the matter for a determination of the claimant’s date of incapacity. See also, Shea, § 31-310.

Trial commissioner ruled that notice, which specified that claimant was pursuing a § 7-433c claim, was insufficient to provide adequate notice of a workers’ compensation claim under § 31-294c. Commissioner pointed out that notice did not specify place of injury as well. CRB reversed. Despite difference between § 7-433c claim (which does not require proof of causal connection) and a chapter 568 claim, notice still contained the basic requisite elements of notice under § 31-294c. Employer must show that it was ignorant of the circumstances of injury and that it was prejudiced by the defects in the notice under § 31-294c(c). (Frankl, C., DISSENTING) By specifying that he was proceeding under § 7-433c, claimant did not inform his employer that he proposed to claim benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Commissioner reasonably concluded notice was insufficient. See also, Demello, § 7-433c.

Marshall v. UTC/ Pratt & Whitney, 3623 CRB-1-97-6 (August 20, 1998), aff’d, 55 Conn. App. 902 (1999)(per curiam), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 904 (1999).

The trial commissioner concluded that the claimant failed to prove that his chronic obstructive pulmonary disease was caused by toxic exposure at his workplace rather than by cigarette smoking. In support of his appeal, the claimant contends that his Motion to Preclude should have been granted because the respondents’ disclaimer was legally insufficient. The board declined to rule on that issue, as it had already issued a decision regarding the Motion to Preclude in Marshall v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 204, 1317 CRD-1-91-10 (September 27, 1993) (see notes infra and at § 31-301. Appeal procedure). Thus, the September 27, 1993 decision by the board became the law of the case, subject to a right of appeal to the Appellate Court.

Comparison of instant case with Troske v. Wolcott Manor, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 323, 1687 CRB-5-93-4 (April 26, 1995), insofar as claimant could not identify specific date of compensable injury. CRB affirmed finding that injury was compensable. See also, Roche, § 31-275(1), § 31-301. Factual findings.

CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s granting of the claimant’s Motion to Preclude. The claimant’s notice of claim accurately listed the date of the claimant’s alleged cardiomyopathy as the date he was rushed to the hospital and diagnosed with congestive cardiomyopathy. Also, although respondents contend that claimant was on the payroll of Hendel, Inc., the claimant was hired by Hendel Petroleum Co., worked under the control of Hendel Petroleum Co., and was never advised that the payor of his wages had been changed.

Employer #1 claimed that responsibility for disability should be apportioned with employer #2, and requested an informal hearing within one year of the date of last exposure to repetitive trauma. Commissioner apportioned liability for permanency. Employer #2 appealed, claiming that first employer did not have standing to request a hearing pursuant to Figueroa v. C&S Ball Bearing, 237 Conn. 1 (1996). CRB affirmed. Figueroa states that a claimant must initiate workers’ compensation proceedings where a claim has not been filed. Once a claim has been filed, however, an insurer or employer may seek apportionment by the commissioner for its liability, where appropriate. Also, CRB held that the medical evidence sufficiently demonstrated that the claimant’s subsequent employment with Employer #2 exacerbated his back condition, which began with his injury while working for Employer #1. See also, Gaudino, § 31-301. Factual findings.

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s denial of claimant’s Motion to Preclude. The claimant contended that the respondent’s Form 43 was insufficient because it named the claimant’s deceased husband rather than the claimant dependent widow. CRB held that respondent’s Form 43 was sufficient, as it was sent to the correct address and listed the reasons the respondent contested the claim.

CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s decision that the claimant’s notice of claim filed on May 29, 1987 was timely where the claimant’s date of injury was February 10, 1987 (her last date of employment). The employer contended that the trial commissioner failed to address the issue of whether the claimant’s notice was timely in light of the employer’s argument that the claimant was aware of her lung injury in 1979. No error, as date of knowledge is not relevant in determining statute of limitations in repetitive trauma cases.

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s decision to dismiss repetitive trauma claim for hearing loss. Trier’s finding that claimant had not established his condition to be an occupational disease was not contradicted by material, undisputed facts, so one-year statute of limitations applied. Also, claimant’s annual hearing tests did not constitute medical treatment under § 31-294c(c) sufficient to trigger the exception to the notice requirement. Employer provided tests to all employees, and was not reacting to a claimed injury or a potential workers’ compensation claim by requiring claimant to see audiologist every year.

CRB reversed trial commissioner’s finding of timely notice based on claimant’s lack of knowledge of relationship between injury and employment. Discuillo v. Stone & Webster, 242 Conn. 570 (1997), establishes that there is no knowledge-based exception for accidental injury claims. No evidence presented of occupational disease here, so claim had to be treated as an accidental injury for jurisdictional purposes. CRB also determined that case should be remanded for finding as to whether or not the repetitive trauma that caused the instant claims also caused the claimant’s right thumb injury, which was accepted in 1993. If so, Landrette v. Bristol, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 149, 1279 CRD-6-91-8 (August 19, 1993), applies, and no separate notice of claim would have been necessary in the first place. Prior decision at Khazzaka, 3330 CRB-5-96-4 (June 18, 1996). Also see Subsequent decision at Khazzaka, 3966 CRB-5-99-1 (March 2, 2000).

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s denial of Motion to Preclude, where the Form 30C was incomplete and did not provide sufficient notice to the employer regarding any claim for hypertension.

Decedent worked for numerous printing companies, where he was allegedly exposed to toxic fumes that contributed to his death from lung cancer. None of the respondents contested liability, and the claimant filed a successful Motion to Preclude in 1988 against the decedent’s last employer and the insurer most recently on the risk. Later, they attempted to apportion liability among prior employers and insurers, but trial commissioner denied their request. CRB affirmed. Issue of whether or not causation was proved is a question of fact and evidentiary credibility for trial commissioner, and there were doctor’s reports that held the claimant’s smoking habit to be totally responsible for his lung cancer rather than his chemical exposure. Failure to apportion claim with the other insurer who allegedly was on the risk during claimant’s employment with City Printing is also not erroneous. Claimant’s Motion to Preclude did not address a second insurer for the claimant’s alleged term of employment with City Printing, and it was not contemplated at that time that the Motion to Preclude concerned any parties other than City Printing and Chubb & Son, Inc. See also, Barron, § 31-299b, § 31-301. Factual findings.

The CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s determination that the claimant failed to file a timely notice of claim for a seizure disorder caused by an accident in which the claimant was hit in the head with a crow bar. The claimant did not file a notice of claim until eight years later, contending that he did not know that his seizure disorder was caused by the incident at work. Held that because the injury was an accidental injury locatable as to time and place, the claimant was required to file a notice of claim within one year regardless of his alleged lack of knowledge. Furthermore, a co-worker’s application of a bandage to the claimant’s head did not satisfy the “furnishing medical care” exception of § 31-294c.

CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s decision granting the claimant’s Motion to Preclude. The claimant sent a notice of claim by certified mail to the employer’s address where she worked. The respondents contended that the notice of claim was insufficient, arguing that it listed both the employer’s name and the date of injury (for repetitive trauma) incorrectly, and that it was sent to the wrong address. The notice of claim was legally sufficient pursuant to § 31-294c(b).

Based on Supreme Court decision in Discuillo v. Stone & Webster, 242 Conn. 570 (1997), CRB reversed trial commissioner’s ruling that claimant’s lack of knowledge of relationship between employment and carpal tunnel syndrome until fall 1992 made March 1993 notice of injury timely. (Last date of employment was March 15, 1991). Claimant would not be allowed to raise occupational disease argument, either, as nothing was ever alleged concerning that possibility. However, trier had not made a finding regarding sufficiency of 1986 notice of claim for tendonitis in middle finger of right hand; case remanded for findings regarding relationship of carpal tunnel symptoms to 1986 tendonitis symptoms.

Claimant, the decedent’s spouse, sought benefits pursuant to § 31-306 for the death of her husband. The decedent was exposed to asbestos in the workplace, and developed a lung disability. However, the decedent also received various diagnoses, treatments, and opinions as to causation. The decedent was treated with high doses of steroids and immunosuppressing agents. Consequently, the decedent developed leukemia and in 1991, died. In 1988 the decedent filed a claim for benefits under the federal Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, and stopped working due to his lung disability. On the actual LHWCA claim form the decedent noted that he was making a claim for benefits under the LHWCA and the State of Connecticut’s Workers’ Compensation Act. The decedent, however, never pursued his rights under chapter 568. Shortly, after the decedent’s death the claimant filed her claim for widow’s benefits. The respondents contended that the claimant’s claim was untimely because, although the surviving spouse’s claim was filed within one year of the date of death, the claim filed by the decedent was legally insufficient and untimely. The trial commissioner held that the claimant’s claim was timely. The CRB affirmed and held that while the filing of a claim pursuant to the federal Longshore Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act is not legally sufficient notice per se under Connecticut’s Workers’ Compensation Act, under the instant circumstances, the notice was sufficient to apprise the employer that a potential claim may be pending. The CRB referred to its analysis in Buck v. General Dynamics Corp.,/Electric Boat Division, 3324 CRB-2-96-4 (January 21, 1998) as to the timeliness of the widow’s claim. See also, Algiere, § 31-296, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

The CRB reversed the trial commissioner’s determination that the dependent spouse’s claim for benefits was timely. In this instance, the decedent suffered a heart attack in 1975 and filed a claim under the federal Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. The decedent received benefits pursuant to that act. The decedent died in 1986 due to a heart attack which was alleged to be causally related to the 1975 work-related heart attack. The claimant filed her claim for survivor’s benefits within one year of the decedent’s death but more than a decade after the decedent’s heart attack, which was alleged to be the causal nexus. The CRB dismissed on the basis of failure to file a timely notice. The CRB noted that, in this case, the notice under the LHWCA was not notice under Connecticut’s Workers’ Compensation Act. There was nothing in the LHWCA form which would have put the employer on notice that the decedent was also seeking benefits pursuant to chapter 568, particularly because this alleged compensable event occurred some years prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 417 U.S. 713, 100 S.Ct. 2432 (1980), permitting concurrent state and federal jurisdiction. The CRB also found the trier’s conclusion that the decedent was rendered medical treatment to be without legal support. Prior decision, Buck, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 96, 1374 CRB-2-92-1 (February 28, 1994), infra.

CRB reversed trier’s conclusion that claimant provided timely notice of claim for a repetitive trauma injury. The trial commissioner concluded that, because a hearing was held within one year following the date that the claimant first had knowledge of the repetitive trauma injury, an exception to the one-year statute of limitations was thus applicable pursuant to § 31-294c. However, recent Supreme and Appellate Court decisions hold that the claimant’s lack of knowledge is not a legally sufficient basis for allowing more than one year to file a repetitive trauma claim. Subsequent decision at Holmes, 4027 CRB-5-99-4 (November 7, 2000) and, Holmes, 4375 CRB-6-01-4 (March 4, 2002), aff’d, 76 Conn. App. 563 (2003), § 31-349. Prior decision at Holmes, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 369, 1588 CRB-5-92-12 (August 11, 1994), infra, § 31-299b, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Trier did not err by assuming claimant alleged repetitive trauma injury rather than occupational disease, as Form 30C described injury as repetitive trauma, and there were no findings or proposed corrections tending to establish that hearing loss is a disease peculiar to the occupation of construction worker. Issue of “knowledge exception” to one-year statute of limitations for repetitive trauma injuries was irrelevant, as the claimant was aware of the connection between injury and employment 1� years before he filed a notice of claim. Concurrence: there is no knowledge-based exception to one-year repetitive trauma notice period.

New York injury, Massachusetts-based decedent (including business office), Connecticut employer. Trier concluded that notice of claim was untimely. Letter to employer’s human resources manager requesting forms for filing workers’ compensation claim was insufficient to notify employer that claimant sought relief under Chapter 568. The letter did not indicate that the attorney represented the decedent’s wife, did not specify in which state, if any, a claim was being filed, and did not state that an action was definite. Affirmed.

Funaioli v. New London, 3346 CRB-1-96-5 (November 4, 1997), rev’d, 52 Conn. App. 194 (1999).

Trial commissioner improperly found that employer’s first report of injury amounted to timely notice of claim. CRB explained that the Form 15 filed by the claimant with this Commission would not be treated like a notice of claim, and would not signal a Commission employee that someone was filing a claim for compensation, even if it referred to the injured worker as “claimant” and contained other elements required by § 31-294c. Appellate Court reversed board and held commissioner’s conclusions were based on and supported by factual findings. Therefore, trier’s conclusion that documents submitted by the claimant met the notice requirement should be affirmed on appeal. See also, Funaioli, § 31-316. Subsequent decision at Funaioli, 3814 CRB-2-98-5 (June 16, 1999), aff’d, 61 Conn. App. 131 (2000), § 31-301. Factual findings.

Russell v. Mystic Seaport Museum, 3274 CRB-2-96-2 (October 24, 1997), aff’d, 52 Conn. App. 255 (1999), rev’d, 252 Conn. 596 (2000).

CRB affirmed trier’s denial of Motion to Preclude. Date of injury listed as “9/23/94,” which was not the last date of the claimant’s exposure to incidents of repetitive trauma, nor was it the date of a particular shoulder separation. Trier could reasonably have determined that that date did not give the respondents legally sufficient notice to allow a proper investigation of the claim. The respondents’ Forms 43 also may have been adequate notice of intent to contest, as the 5/2/91 date of injury listed there was the date of the initial shoulder separation, and the trier found that this was a recurrent injury situation, not repetitive trauma. CRB also held that first report of injury did not constitute a notice of claim under § 31-294c. Following affirmance of CRB’s decision by Appellate Court, Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the notice of claim was sufficient to support preclusion because it provided adequate information as to period of time over which injury occurred, and there were no other defects. Respondents had failed to file a sufficient notice contesting liability because none of its notices listed the date of the alleged injury or provided specific substantive grounds for contesting compensability. See also, Russell, § 31-316.

Notice was sent by the claimant to the district office and, apparently, to the statutory agent for service listed at the secretary of state’s office, rather than to the employer’s address. CRB held that, although minor defects in notice will be overlooked as long as a respondent is not prejudiced in investigating claims, service of a Form 30C upon a statutory agent is not likely to inform an employer that there is a claim pending. Furthermore, § 31-321 prescribes a different procedure. Certain corrections should have been made, and the trier’s granting of the Motion to Preclude was reversed. However, the commissioner also addressed the merits of the case, and he reasonably credited the testimony of the claimant and his brother in support of the instant claim. CRB cannot reassess his credibility determinations. Affirmed on the merits. See also, McKenna, § 31-321.

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s decision that claimant failed to file a timely notice of claim for a repetitive trauma knee injury. CRB explained that it need not reach the legal issue of whether lack of knowledge may extend the statute of limitations period for repetitive trauma injuries. This is because the trial commissioner specifically found that the claimant knew or should have known that his right knee condition was related to his masonry work when he stopped working for the respondent employer.

Perrelli v. Stack, Inc., 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 211, 3243 CRB-3-95-12 (June 6, 1997).

As there was no timely written notice of claim for the injuries at issue, the trial commissioner properly denied the claimant’s motion to preclude. The trial commissioner found that pursuant to an approved voluntary agreement, the respondents substantially accepted all of the injuries as set forth in the claimant’s original notice of claim. The claimant later filed a notice of claim for additional alleged injuries. The trial commissioner found that the claimant did not file a timely notice of claim within one year of the date of injury for said additional injuries. See also, Perrelli, § 31-301. Subsequent decision at Perrelli, 3546 CRB-3-96-1 (June 4, 1998), § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Roy v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 179, 3131 CRB-1-95-7 (May 12, 1997), aff’d, 48 Conn. App. 904 (1998)(per curiam), cert. denied, 245 Conn. 906 (1998).

Form 43’s reference to date of injury as May 17, 1993 instead of May 3, 1993 did not require that the claimant’s Motion to Preclude be granted. A Form 43 need not be technically perfect as long as specific substantive grounds for contesting a claim are stated. Trier correctly determined that intent to disclaim the alleged stress-induced heart attack was clear, as the description of the respondents’ objections was specific enough to compensate for the incorrect date. See also, Roy, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Trial commissioner erred by granting claimant’s Motion to Preclude the respondents from contesting the circumstances of her injury. As long as substantive grounds for contest are stated, a Form 43 need not be technically perfect. Here, the Form 43 listed five separate grounds for contest, including “any injury to lower back did not arise out of or in the course of employment,” and “no causal connection between the lower back injury and the claimant’s employment.” As claimant must show proof that an incident occurred during her employment in order to prove a causal connection, the respondents’ disclaimer framed this issue as one in dispute. Reversed.

Motion to Preclude properly denied where claimant had failed to file a timely notice of claim. See, Liano, § 31-297, § 31-301. Factual findings. See, Liano, § 31-297, § 31-307, § 31-296 Voluntary agreements (discontinuance of payments). Subsequent decisions at Liano, 3561 CRB-4-97-3 (June 3, 1998), rev’d in part, 55 Conn. App. 75 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 909 (1999), § 31-300; Liano, 3447 CRB-4-96-10 (January 6, 1998), aff’d, 51 Conn. App. 905 (per curiam), cert. denied, 248 Conn. 907 (1999), § 7-433c; companion decision at Liano, 3199 CRB-4-95-10 (March 25, 1997), § 31-279-3, § 31-298, § 31-307. Prior decision at Liano, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 201, 2033 CRB-4-94-5 (July 25, 1995), appeal and cross appeal dismissed, lack of final judgment, A.C. 15082 (June 6, 1996), cert. denied, 238 Conn. 906 (1996), § 7-433b, § 31-300, § 31-310.

Marandino v. Marandino’s, 3130 CRB-6-95-7 (March 20, 1997), aff’d, 48 Conn. App. 916 (1998)(per curiam), cert. denied, 245 Conn. 919 (1998).

In order to entertain Motion to Preclude, trier had to first determine whether subject matter jurisdiction over claim existed. No error in considering whether claimant had elected to be covered as sole proprietor. See also, Marandino, § 31-275(10).

Bonin v. Thames Valley Steel, 1492 CRB-2-92-8 (February 14, 1997), dismissed for lack of final judgment, A.C. 16963 (May 28, 1997).

Respondents failed to file timely disclaimer to Form 30C, but commissioner denied Motion to Preclude because of five-day discrepancy in date of injury on notice of claim for repetitive trauma injury. Commissioner then granted claimant’s Motion to Correct in light of Quinn v. Knapp, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 334, 1470 CRB-8-92-7 (July 8, 1994), and granted Motion to Preclude because it substantially complied with § 31-297b. CRB affirmed; five-day discrepancy not likely to mislead employer as to nature of injury under circumstances of this case. See also, Bonin, § 31-321.

Form 30C and voluntary agreement only referred to left leg and ankle injuries. Claimant subsequently made a back injury claim arising from same incident 19 months after the accidental injury occurred. Held: once trial commissioner determined that back injury was related to compensable injury, no additional notice of claim was necessary. See, Landrette v. Bristol, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 149, 1279 CRD-6-91-8 (August 19, 1993).

The determination of when the claimant had sufficient knowledge to commence the running of the three-year statute of limitations period for occupational disease claims is normally a question of fact for the trial commissioner. CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s determination that claimant’s notice of claim for asbestosis timely filed. See also, Uttenweiler, § 31-308(b).

See, Cunningham, § 31-275(16) notes on personal injury.

Denial of Motion to Preclude included no findings of facts, and thus no specific reasons for denying preclusion. Review impossible. Remanded.

Britt v. Wallace Manufacturing, 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 147, 2284 CRB-1-95-2 (November 29, 1996), aff’d, 47 Conn. App. 902 (1997)(per curiam).

CRB affirmed commissioner’s dismissal of claim on ground of untimely notice. Law allowed trier to find that last day of exposure to incidents of repetitive trauma predated last date of employment. (Wilson, C., CONCURRING) (awareness of causal relationship between injury and employment is always irrelevant for purpose of repetitive trauma injury one-year notice period).

CRB reversed trial commissioner’s determination that claimant had filed a timely notice of claim for carpal tunnel. Citing Dorsey v. UTC/Norden Systems, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 447, 2268 CRB-7-95-1 (September 6, 1996), aff’d, 45 Conn. App. 707 (1997), remanded to Appellate Court in light of Supreme Court’s decision in Discuillo, 242 Conn. 570 (1997), aff’d on remand, 47 Conn. App. 810 (1998), the CRB held that the claimant’s lack of knowledge does not extend the time period for filing a timely notice of claim for repetitive trauma. (Frankl, C., DISSENTING) (the DISSENTING opinion explained that a lack of knowledge should extend the time period for filing a timely claim).

CRB affirmed commissioner’s conclusion that notice of carpal tunnel claim was untimely. Commissioner based his decision on finding that claimant knew or should have known of causal link between employment and injury on March 17, 1989, triggering one-year notice period for repetitive trauma injuries; notice was not filed until May 24, 1990. Testimony supported that finding; fact that claimant was not completely certain of diagnosis until June or July did not reduce awareness of causal link to a mere suspicion. Moreover, date of injury in repetitive trauma case is last date of exposure; findings indicated that exposure to incidents of repetitive trauma ceased in 1980, when claimant was promoted. Thus, operative last date of employment was much earlier. Recent decisions overrule doctrine that delayed running of non-claim statute until claimant did/should have realized causal link between employment and injury. (Frankl, C., CONCURRING) (doctrine delaying running of statute of non-claim based on lack of knowledge of causal link should not be overruled).

Claimant sent letter enclosing Form 30C to employer, who responded by filing a Form 43 stating that “employee’s allegations of cancer relating to original incident appear to be non-work related, liability and medical denied. Non-claim statu[t]e.” Form 43 referenced a 1979 date of injury, however, which was for a chemical exposure incident unrelated to the claimant’s kidney cancer claim. Trial commissioner ruled that Form 43 sufficiently conformed with specificity requirements of § 31-294 to withstand Motion to Preclude. Affirmed; remedial purpose of Workers’ Compensation Act mandates that CRB overlook minor defects in notice as long as party is not prejudiced in ability to investigate claims. Similar policy applies here, as employer’s notice clearly contested both elements of claimant’s prima facie workers’ compensation case. Reference of 1979 date of injury not necessarily misleading to claimant, especially since Form 43 mentioned cancer.

Cislo v. Shelton, 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 14, 2291 CRB-4-95-2 (October 4, 1996).

Claimant sent letter to chief of police informing him of claimant’s ongoing treatment for hypertension and asking him to take “any necessary steps.” Commissioner ruled that said letter provided timely notice of injury under statute. Reversed: documents submitted by claimant did not strictly comply with § 31-294c, nor did they substantially comply with the statute’s purpose. Claimant’s letter did not indicate that claimant was seeking workers’ compensation benefits, and employer had no way of knowing that a claim was being pursued and that it should commence an investigation of the claim.

Felix v. Merriam Manufacturing Co., 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 466, 2288 CRB-3-95-2 (September 12, 1996) (corrected September 16, 1996).

Claimant began developing carpal tunnel symptoms in 1989, had surgery on left wrist in August 1990. Claimant filed Form 30C in December 1991, listing date of injury as August 22, 1990 (the surgery date), and stating that she was unaware her repetitive trauma injury was work-related until September 1991. In three separate opinions, the CRB affirmed the commissioner’s decision that medical bills associated with the August 1990 surgery should not be the respondents’ responsibility, but that the claimant’s last date of employment was September 27, 1991, thus making notice timely with respect to carpal tunnel in her right hand and potential post-surgery trauma to her left hand. (Frankl, C.). Repetitive trauma injury occurs on last date of exposure to incidents of trauma, which is usually last date of employment. Only exception is where claimant is unaware that disabling condition is work-related until after she leaves employment. Here, commissioner found that claimant should have known August 1990 surgery was related to employment. Surgery marked close of trauma period to left hand, so notice would have been due within one year from that date. However, notice was sufficient to preserve claim for potential exposure to right hand, or post-surgery exposure to left hand. (Santos, C., DISSENTING in part) (no finding that claimant ceased being exposed to incidents of repetitive trauma during course of her employment; no legal basis to establish that trauma period was somehow broken by August 1990 surgery. Whole claim should be compensable). (Wilson, C., DISSENTING in part) (whole claim should be dismissed; claimant could have introduced evidence of repetitive trauma following her return to work after surgery, but did not do so. Piecemeal presentation of cases is not allowed in workers’ compensation proceedings. Also, trial commissioner’s finding that claimant “knew or should have known” August 1990 surgery was work-related was not relevant, as § 31-294c only allows one year from the date of last exposure to file a claim. The knowledge-based exception for late manifestation of symptoms only applies to occupational diseases).

Dorsey v. UTC/Norden Systems, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 447, 2268 CRB-7-95-1 (September 6, 1996), aff’d, 45 Conn. App. 707 (1997), remanded to Appellate Court in light of Supreme Court’s decision in Discuillo, 242 Conn. 570 (1997), aff’d on remand, 47 Conn. App. 810 (1998).

The trial commissioner found that the claimant retired from the respondent employer on March 11, 1990, but did not become aware that he had suffered a hearing loss which may have been connected to his work until he went to a doctor on January 5, 1993. The commissioner thus found the claimant’s January 14, 1993 notice of claim to be timely. CRB reversed, holding that the claimant’s lack of knowledge regarding his hearing loss does not extend the time period for filing a timely notice of claim for repetitive trauma. CRB thus reversed Boutin v. Industrial Components, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 19, 237 CRD-6-83 (March 3, 1987). (Frankl, C., DISSENTING) (the DISSENTING opinion, citing legislative histories of related statutes and development of case law, explained that a lack of knowledge should extend the time period for filing a timely claim).

Trial commissioner dismissed claim for late notice. Affirmed. Claimant had forwarded reports of medical care and bills to insurance company, but had not filed a Form 30C with this Commission or his employer. Also, there was confusion surrounding the exact date of injury. Commissioner reasonably concluded that § 31-294c was not substantially complied with. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed contending the board failed to consider one of claimant’s appellate arguments - the insurer in this case set up a claim file at least one day prior to the date the statute of limitations expired. CRB noted issue was considered. Knowledge of the place of accident and nature of injury are not conveyed by assigning a claim number and claim file. Motion denied. See, Altamura, 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 1, 2170 CRB-7-94-10 (October 1, 1996). See also, Altamura, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-278 Jurisdiction/Disqualification.

Drivas v. Fair Auto Park, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 366, 2279 CRB-7-95-1 (June 28, 1996).

Commissioner properly denied Motion to Preclude. Where date of heart attack was one day off in notice of claim, notice could not be presumed legally sufficient to notify employer that injury occurred a day earlier. Where there is doubt, decision to proceed on merits is a wise one. Subsequent decision at Drivas, 4383 CRB-7-01-4 (March 1, 2002), § 31-275(1).

Riccio v. Windsor, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 279, 2232 CRB-1-94-12 (June 20, 1996).

The commissioner found that the claimant, a police officer, failed to give notice of his claim for heart and hypertension benefits as required by § 31-294c C.G.S., and therefore dismissed the claim. CRB noted that the Appellate Court recently held that a § 7-433c hypertension claim is not presumed to be an occupational disease. Zaleta v. Fairfield, 38 Conn. App. 1, 7 (1995), cert. denied, 234 Conn. 917 (1995). The commissioner specifically found that the employer-provided routine medical examination, along with a referral for an echocardiogram, did not constitute the furnishing of medical treatment so as to obviate the need for filing a proper notice of claim. See also, Riccio, § 7-433c.

Gaffney v. Stamford, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 257, 2219 CRB-7-94-11 (May 24, 1996).

Claimant did not file a notice of claim within one year of her 1/25/89 injury; although claimant filed accident report with employer, she did not seek treatment for eye injury until 1/2/90, and did not file Form 30C until 3/9/90. Held, none of the exceptions under § 31-294 was met, oral request for hearing on 1/23/90 at district office was insufficient to apprise employer of the existence of a claim, and no exception can be created for filing of Form 43 by respondents. CRB cannot broaden express language of statute, especially where subject matter jurisdiction is implicated. There is no knowledge-based exception to the one-year requirement, either. (Vargas, C., DISSENTING) (employer clearly had notice of injury immediately following incident, as first report of injury and Form 43 demonstrate. Substantial compliance with the notice content requirements tolls running of statutory period). See, Hayden-Leblanc, infra. Humanitarian purpose of Act also favors allowing claimant to pursue the merits of her claim.

Commissioner erred in granting Motion to Preclude. Although rule of strict compliance has been modified by CRB pursuant to Pereira v. State, 228 Conn. 535, 542-43 n.8 (1994), the basic elements of a notice of claim must still be present to trigger an employer’s investigative responsibility. Here, claimant did not describe time and circumstances of injury with sufficient accuracy.

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s dismissal of claim for myocardial infarction which was filed more than one year following the heart attack. CRB has consistently ruled that a heart attack is an injury which may be definitely located as to the time when and the place where the accident occurred and not as an injury which is the direct result of repetitive trauma or occupational disease.

Motion to Preclude is final judgment for purposes of appeal to CRB. Where claimant filled out report of injury for employer, but did not file Form 30C, commissioner was entitled to deny Motion to Preclude that was based on late filing of employer’s Form 43. Documents filed by claimant did not necessarily provide sufficient notice to investigate claim, as no claim for compensation was actually filed. Clarity of date, time, place of injury are not the only considerations.

The commissioner found that on November 5, 1992, the claimant, a state police trooper, filed a timely notice of claim for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) which was initially caused by an August 19, 1988 shooting incident. The determination of whether a claimant is exposed to repetitive trauma up until his last date of employment is a question of fact to be made by the trial commissioner. The commissioner concluded that the claimant’s notice was timely because the claimant had been subjected to repetitive trauma until his last day of employment on October 22, 1992. As there were no findings of fact on the continued repetitive trauma, CRB remanded the case to commissioner. (D’Oyen, C., DISSENTING) (claim was not timely as it was not filed within one year from the August 19, 1988 incident, and as that was the only work related cause of the PTSD, the claim should have been filed within one year of that date).

Smith v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 336, 2006 CRB-1-94-3 (September 20, 1995), aff’d, 43 Conn. App. 910 (1996)(per curiam).

Claimant’s exposure to repetitive trauma ceased after he left the workplace; notice of claim filed over 15 months later was thus untimely. Commissioner disregarded claimant’s testimony that he did not realize injury was work-related until four months after he left work, thus Boutin, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 19, 237 CRD-6-83 (March 3, 1987), infra, does not apply. See also, Smith, § 31-298, and § 31-301. Factual findings.

Knapp v. New London, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 325, 2002 CRB-2-94-3 (September 15, 1995), aff’d, 44 Conn. App. 465 (1997).

The commissioner properly dismissed the claimant’s claim for hearing loss due to failure to file notice within one year pursuant to § 31-294c(a). The claimant filed his claim for workers’ compensation on October 25, 1991, alleging that he sustained permanent partial binaural hearing loss. The commissioner found that the claimant’s hearing loss occurred prior to 1985, and that subsequent to 1985, because he was promoted to foreman, he was no longer exposed to repetitive trauma in the form of noise exposure.

Commissioner properly denied Motion to Preclude; notice of claim was untimely on its face as to one date of injury, and the other date of injury for repetitive trauma claim postdated last day of employment, thus failing to sufficiently notify respondent of details of injury. Also, Motion to Preclude was premised on failure to send Form 43 by certified mail; spirit of Pereira v. State, 228 Conn. 535, 542-43 n.8 (1994), requires CRB to consider fact that notice was in fact received by both claimant and commissioner.

CRB affirmed commissioner’s decision that claimant’s notice of claim for asthma, an occupational disease, was timely filed. Statute of limitations begins to run when symptoms are manifested, which is a factual question.

CRB found that claimant filed a late notice of claim for occupational lung disease, thus reversing commissioner’s decision. CRB found that statute of limitations period began running when claimant’s physician told him that his lung disease was related to his employment.

Dismissal for lack of timely notice affirmed. Fact that claimant told her supervisor of her accident is not the equivalent of filing a workers’ compensation claim under Connecticut law. None of the exceptions under § 31-294(b) were met, either; medical treatment paid for by group health policy, not employer. Circumstances of injury (car accident) did not automatically put employer on notice that injury was employment-related.

Duni v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 137, 2052 CRB-1-94-5 (June 12, 1995), aff’d, 239 Conn. 19 (1996).

Given virtual identity of facts surrounding Form 43 with those in Walter, infra, denial of Motion to Preclude affirmed. Also, § 31-294c gives claimant one year from date of death to file claim in all cases. See, Capen v. General Dynamics Corp., 38 Conn. App. 73 (1995). See also, Duni, § 31-306.

Similar facts as Walter decision below, except defective notice was sent to decedent employee in care of law firm rather than at claimant’s address. Held: since lawyer did receive notice, and did file a timely Motion to Preclude on claimant’s behalf, and considering our decisions in Walter, infra and in Robinson, infra, equity and justice would not be served by precluding employer from contesting this case. Reversed.

State failed to include names of claimants on Form 43s; instead, forms were addressed to deceased employee. Commissioner granted claimants’ Motion to Preclude. Held, in light of emphasis in Pereira v. State, 228 Conn. 535, 542-43 n.8 (1994), and other recent decisions on remedial purpose of Workers’ Compensation Act, rule of strict compliance must be relaxed. Question is now whether notice to contest substantially complied with § 31-294c(b) and sufficiently apprised claimants of reasons for denying compensability. CRB also noted that Form 43 did not instruct preparer to specify name of claimant rather than name of employee. Here, state substantially complied with statute, and claimants did not suffer prejudice from deficiency. Reversed and remanded. See also, Walter, § 31-301-9 Additional evidence. Subsequent decision at Walter, 3785 CRB-2-98-3 (June 18, 1999), aff’d, 63 Conn. App. 1 (2001), § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Discuillo v. Stone & Webster, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 95, 1935 CRB-2-93-12 (May 19, 1995), aff’d, 43 Conn. App. 224 (1996), aff’d, 242 Conn. 570 (1997).

CRB reversed the trial commissioner’s finding that claimant’s September 1984 notice of claim for a heart attack which occurred November 1982 was compensable. The CRB noted that such injuries are considered as accidental injuries and not the result of repetitive trauma. Thus, the claim should have been filed within one year from the date of claimant’s heart attack.

Giovino v. West Hartford, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 74, 1912 CRB-1-93-12 (May 12, 1995).

Giovino v. West Hartford, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 74, 1912 CRB-1-93-12 (May 12, 1995). Claimant alleged repetitive trauma due to exposure to gunfire. Issue was whether notice of claim was timely filed. CRB cited Borent v. State, 33 Conn. App. 495 (1994), and held that last date of exposure is usually but not necessarily the last date of employment. Respondents contended that claimant was not exposed to gunfire during the end of his employment period. CRB remanded for determination of date of last exposure to gunfire. See also, Giovino, § 31-298 and § 31-310.

Claimant, a workfare recipient, sent notice of claim to Mission instead of City of Hartford. Held, § 17b-689(g) provides that workfare employees are employees of the town for purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Fact that Mission may have had control over claimant’s employment within meaning of § 31-275(10) irrelevant given language of workfare statute. Also, no agency relationship shown between City and Mission for purpose of receiving notice. Commissioner properly dismissed claim; employer was not made party to proceedings.

CRB affirmed commissioner’s denial of claimant’s motion to preclude, even though employer had filed an untimely disclaimer. Claimant’s notice of claim was not sufficient to support preclusion under the test in Pereira v. State, 228 Conn. 535, 542-43 n.8 (1994). Specifically, notice of claim was insufficient to allow for timely investigation of claim by employer because it directly contradicted the claimant’s prior acknowledgment of physical defect.

Keegan v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 340, 1793 CRB-1-93-8 (April 27, 1995), aff’d, 42 Conn. App. 803 (1996), cert. denied, 239 Conn. 942 (1996).

Statute is jurisdictional in nature; one-year time limit for filing claims not ambiguous. Claimant’s accidental hip injury was not an occupational disease; see § 31-275(15); and thus the one-year statute of limitations applied. Notice untimely. (Santos, C., DISSENTING) (claimant assumed injury was a minor bump on her hip; purpose of Workers’ Compensation Act is not to require an employee to file a claim for every minor injury. Date of incapacity should be applied under Mulligan v. F.S. Electric, 231 Conn. 529 (1994), where immediate disability did not occur). See also, Keegan, § 31-275(15).

Where claimant could not remember and did not allege exact date of injury, claimant’s notice defective. Notice otherwise timely. Commissioner should have given employer opportunity to demonstrate prejudice as result of defect; further proceedings necessary. See also, Troske, § 31-275(16).

Otero v. Bridgeport, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 248, 1713 CRB-4-93-4 (April 17, 1995).

Claimant followed police procedure in reporting injuries to employer, which consisted of filling out accident and personal injury reports signed by superior officer and directed to Board of Police Commissioners. Notice of claim not filed with Workers’ Compensation Commission until almost five years later. Held, claimant did not give timely notice of existence of claim to his employer or this commission by simply reporting his injury to the police department. Thus, commission has no jurisdiction over claim.

Because notice of claim was defective (incorrect date of injury), commissioner denied claimant’s motion to preclude the respondents from asserting the defense of “horseplay.” CRB affirmed denial of preclusion, citing Pereira v. State, 228 Conn. 535, 542-43 n.8 (1994). See also, Simmons, § 31-275(1), § 31-298 and § 31-284(a).

Where connection between employment and injury is not initially apparent, statute of limitations begins running on date that employee knew or should have known that disabling condition arose out of and in course of employment. Here, testimony of claimant supported commissioner’s conclusion that claimant’s suspicion of injury did not rise to level of known manifestation of symptom until 11/29/91. See also, Santry, § 31-301. Factual findings. NB: But see later cases, such as Dorsey, supra, (this section).

One-year rather than three-year limitation on filing a claim applies where the claimant’s psychiatric condition was not shown to be an occupational disease. See also, Nanni, § 31-275(15).

Griffith-Patton v. State/Dept. of Agriculture, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 177, 1888 CRB-1-93-11 (March 10, 1995), aff’d, 41 Conn. App. 911 (1996)(per curiam), cert. denied, 237 Conn. 930 (1996).

One-year notice exception for employer-furnished medical care not applicable where claimant’s psychiatric treatment was paid for in part by claimant and in part by health insurance policy. Commissioner could determine that employer not aware of potential workers’ compensation claim within meaning of Gesmundo v. Bush, 133 Conn. 607 (1947). See also, Griffith-Patton, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Notice of claimant’s claim for benefits timely, as Form 30C filed within three years of date claimant became aware of occupational disease. Dependent widow’s failure to file Form 30C was not fatal to her claim because hearing on her entitlement to death benefits was held within one year of the date of claimant’s death. See also, York, § 31-298.

Campbell v. Manchester Memorial Hospital, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 157, 1754 CRB-1-93-6 (March 8, 1995), dismissed for lack of final judgment, A.C. 14611(May 24, 1995).

Repetitive trauma injury cannot be definitely located as to time and place, so last day of exposure or employment is date of injury as a matter of law, and date notice period begins to run. The fact that the claimant was aware of her condition and its relation to her work prior to that date is irrelevant. See also, Campbell, § 31-301. Factual findings. Prior decision at Campbell, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 151, 1182 CRD-5-91-2 (June 30, 1992), infra.

Though sufficiency of notice is a question of subject matter jurisdiction, the respondent was not entitled to raise questions as to timeliness that could have been raised in a prior appeal to this board. See, Peters I, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 32, 1103 CRD-3-90-8 (January 13, 1992). As the same issue was considered before, CRB declined to reconsider it in interest of finality. See also, Peters, § 31-308(b)(c).

Claimant insisted injury occurred on 11/4/91, although commissioner found injury occurred on 10/29/91. Thus, Motion to Preclude denied even though employer failed to file Form 43. Held, Motion to Preclude is a final judgment and can be appealed under § 31-301(a). Rule that strict compliance with notice requirements of § 31-294c is necessary before preclusion can lie abandoned in light of Supreme Court decision in Pereira v. State, 228 Conn. 535, 542-43 n.8 (1994); question is now whether notice sufficient to allow investigation of claim. Also, commissioner should not have made finding as to incorrect injury date; Motion to Preclude should have instead been granted as to 11/4 date of injury, with employer retaining right to litigate compensability of injuries in fact occurring on other dates.

Conetta v. Stamford, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 68, 1491 CRB-7-92-8 (December 29, 1994).

See, Conetta, § 31-275(1) and § 31-301. Factual findings. See also, Conetta v. Stamford, 16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 228, 3231 CRB-7-95-12 (June 23, 1997), appeal dismissed, 246 Conn. 281 (1998).

Notice of claim filed in 1988 for a 1982 aneurysm filed beyond time prescribed by statute. See also, Searles, § 31-275(1), § 31-301. Factual findings and § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Notice of claim need not state claimant’s home as the place of injury in order to comply with statute. Also, notice of claim mailed to employer at various addresses excluding employer’s corporate insurance department address complied with § 31-321. Therefore, trier’s finding granting claimant’s motion to preclude affirmed where employer failed to disclaim within twenty-eight (28) days and notice of claim satisfied statutory requirements.

Remanded where trier failed to make specific findings as to claimant’s last date of exposure to repetitive trauma in determining claim was untimely filed. See also, Britt, § 31-275(16)[formerly 31-275(8)].

Remanded where trier failed to make necessary findings with respect to timeliness of claim. See also, Holmes, § 31-299b and § 31-301. Factual findings. Subsequent decision at Holmes, 3338 CRB-8-96-5 (December 16, 1997), supra, 4027 CRB-5-99-4 (November 7, 2000), § 31-349, Holmes, 4375 CRB-6-01-4 (March 4, 2002), aff’d, 76 Conn. App. 563 (2003).

Quinn v. Standard Knapp, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 334, 1470 CRB-8-92-7 (July 8, 1994), dismissed for lack of final judgment, 40 Conn. App. 449 (1996).

Motion to Preclude granted for work related stress claim. CRB previously held in repetitive trauma cases the last day worked is the date of injury. Here, claimant’s notice of claim stated the date of injury as being one day after the last day worked, the date of claimant’s incapacity, an insignificant inaccuracy which will not prevent preclusion. Discussion of importance of date of injury in notice of claim for accidental injury and repetitive trauma cases.

CRB affirmed trier’s ruling granting claimant’s motion to preclude. Notice of claim filed in January 1990 for a repetitive trauma low back injury which occurred from January 2 to June 30, 1989, the last day worked, complies with jurisdictional time limitation prescribed by statute. Additionally, claimant is only required to show an employer/employee relationship existed at the time of the injury, not at a later time when the notice of claim was filed.

Micklos v. Iseli Company, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 302, 1450 CRB-5-92-7 (June 17, 1994).

Trier erred in denying Motion to Preclude where claim for hearing loss was timely filed. Nevertheless, trier’s inquiry as to the extent of disability permitted and his conclusion that claimant’s hearing loss was not worsened by work related noise incidents affirmed. See, Borent v. State, 33 Conn. App. 495 (1994). See also, Micklos, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Busak v. Stamford, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 291, 1562 CRB-7-92-11 (June 8, 1994), aff’d, 39 Conn. App. 919 (1995)(per curiam).

Notice of claim filed in 1990 for a 1988 injury time-barred where trier found no specific injury or repetitive trauma. See also, Busak, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Freeman v. Hull Dye & Print, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 259, 1516 CRB-5-92-9 (June 2, 1994), rev’d on other grounds, 39 Conn. App. 717 (1995).

Widow’s claim for dependent’s benefits dismissed where trier found widow failed to file a timely claim or request a hearing regarding dependent’s benefits within statutory time period. See also, Freeman, § 31-275(15) and § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Sellew v. Northeast Utilities, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 135, 1422 CRB-8-92-5 (April 7, 1994), dismissed for lack of final judgment, A. C. 13541, 13542 (6/14/94).

Remanded for determination whether widow’s notice of claim was timely filed absent a factual finding as to whether a timely informal hearing satisfies exception to § 31-294 notice requirements. See also, Sellew, § 31-275(15), § 31-310 and § 52-572r.

Remanded as timeliness of notice of claim is a jurisdictional requirement which must be satisfied. Trier’s decision lacked a factual finding on this issue. See subsequent decision Buck, 3324 CRB-2-96-4 (January 21, 1998), supra.

Zaleta v. Fairfield, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 125, 1453 CRB-4-92-7 (February 28, 1994), rev’d, 38 Conn. App. 1 (1995), cert. denied, 234 Conn. 917 (1995).

CRB found claimant’s request for a hearing within three years from the date of diagnosis of hypertension satisfied notice of claim requirement. Court reversed CRB’s conclusion that firefighter’s hypertension was presumptively an occupational disease. Because there was no evidence that the hypertension was an occupational disease, three-year statute of limitation did not apply. See also, Zaleta, § 7-433c.

Notice to contest liability must be filed within statutorily prescribed time to the workers’ compensation commissioner. Employer is not required to send notice to employee within the same period. See also, Schena, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

CRB held disclaimer language does not appreciably differ from the language held sufficiently specific by the appellate court in Tovish v. Gerber Electronics, 19 Conn. App. 273 (1989).

Motion to Preclude denied where it was found claimant was not an employee of the respondent employer and claimant’s injuries were the result of her own intentional acts. See also, Peddle, § 31-275(1), § 31-284(a), § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Respondents’ attempt, after remand, to raise additional non-jurisdictional grounds before trier in opposition to claimant’s Motion to Preclude where CRB previously rendered a decision in Mingrone, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 252, 1109 CRD-7-90-9 (November 21, 1991) properly rejected. Additionally, any new grounds raised in opposition to Motion would allow an unreasonable delay of the ultimate determination of the claim. See also, Mingrone, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Medical care received by claimant at the expense of the employer within one year of the injury constituted the furnishing of medical care where employer had knowledge of circumstances surrounding the injury. See also, Paresi, § 31-340, § 31-343.

CRB affirmed trier’s ruling granting claimant’s Motion to Preclude. Claimant’s date of injury occurred prior to the effective date of the warning requirement language of P.A. 90-116 § 9 which required notices of claim to contain a provision as to the preclusive effects of failing to timely disclaim liability. Even though notice was not served until after the effective date of P.A. 90-116 § 9, CRB held § 9 is not applicable where the date of injury proceeds the effective date of P.A. 90-116 § 9, October 1, 1990.

Written group medical form and group insurer’s written rejection constituted written notice within one year where employer advised claimant that the time for filing a claim had lapsed when in fact the time had not passed and claimant later filed a claim. CRB held under the totality of circumstances notice requirements of § 31-294 were substantially complied with.

Trier properly concluded that widow’s claim for dependency benefits filed within one year of the death of the decedent was timely thereby satisfying the requirements of § 31-294c (formerly § 31-294). See also, Capen, § 31-306, § 31-299b.

CRB affirmed trier’s finding that claimant’s back injury was the result of years of repetitive trauma at work rather than one single lifting incident. Claimant’s notice of claim was timely filed.

Claimant’s notice of claim listed a number of injuries which allegedly arose out of and during the course of employment. Respondents’ first disclaimer was valid however it only contested the carpal tunnel syndrome. A subsequent disclaimer contesting the rest of the injuries alleged in claimant’s notice of claim was untimely filed for § 31-294c purposes. Trier found, and CRB affirmed, trier’s ruling granting claimant’s Motion to Preclude as to other injuries and limiting respondents’ contest to whether claimant’s carpal tunnel syndrome arose out of and in the course of employment.

CRB affirmed trier’s ruling denying claimant’s Motion to Preclude as respondent’s disclaimer language was sufficiently specific applying appellate court’s standard in Tovish v. Gerber Electronics, 19 Conn. App. 273 (1989). See also, Marshall, § 31-301. Appeal procedure. Subsequent decision at Marshall, 3623 CRB-1-97-6 (August 20, 1998), aff’d, 55 Conn. App. 902 (1999)(per curiam), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 904 (1999), supra.

When calculating twenty-eight day period for contesting a claim for compensation, calculation begins on the day after receipt of a notice of claim for compensation. CRB affirmed trier’s ruling that respondents’ disclaimer was timely filed. Further, CRB held disclaimer language sufficiently specific, applying the standard accepted by the court in Tovish v. Gerber Electronics, 19 Conn. App. 273 (1989).

Magram v. Middletown, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 167, 1348 CRD-8-91-11 (September 1, 1993).

Trier’s ruling granting claimant’s Motion to Preclude reversed. Respondents’ notice to contest liability was timely filed with the compensation commissioner. Statute does not require claimant receive notice to contest within time prescribed. See, Vachon v. General Dynamics Corp., 29 Conn. App. 654 (1992).

Rice v. Vermilyn Brown, Inc., 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 156, 1300 CRD-2-91-9 (August 23, 1993), aff’d, 232 Conn. 780 (1995).

CRB reversed trial commissioner. CRB held trier failed to apply the statute of limitations provision of § 1330e pertaining to occupational disease claims as it existed in 1942. Additionally, application of statute is substantive and may not be applied retrospectively. CRB relied on Niedzwicki v. Pequonnoch Foundry, 133 Conn. 78 (1946) as directly on point.

Landrette v. Bristol, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 149, 1279 CRD-6-91-8 (August 19, 1993).

CRB affirmed trier’s finding that police officer’s mouth injury was causally related to an altercation wherein claimant suffered an accepted compensable injury to his ankle. Respondents contended claimant’s written notice of claim failed to identify the mouth injury and therefore written notice was untimely. CRB held once trier determined the mouth injury was causally related to a work injury the need for any further notice was unnecessary. See, Hebert v. New Departure Hyatt Bearings, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 94, 300 CRD-6-84 (June 12, 1987), no error, 14 Conn. App. 819 (1988).

Remanded. Trier made no factual finding concerning timeliness of widow’s claim for benefits due to decedent’s asbestos exposure and CRB was unable to determine whether a timely notice was filed. Record below lacks reviewable evidence in order for CRB to make a proper determination. See also, St. Amour, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Galgano v. Torrington, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 133, 1280 CRD-5-91-8 (June 30, 1993).

Absent a timely notice of claim, an independent medical examination does not constitute the furnishing of medical care.

As notice failed to properly identify employer, the technical requirements of § 31-294 were not satisfied. See, Pereira v. State, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 9, 906 CRD-7-89-8 (January 8, 1991), aff’d, 228 Conn. 535 (1994). Additionally, even if the prior forwarding of two Reports of Accident or Occupational Disease (First Report of Injury) satisfied the technical requirements of § 31-294, claimant failed to serve these documents in accordance with § 31-321. CRB affirmed trier’s denial of claimant’s Motion to Preclude.

Remanded as trier failed to determine whether an employer-employee relationship existed. This requisite relationship must be established before a Motion to Preclude can lie.

Niles v. Autac, Inc., 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 45, 1261 CRD-3-91-7 (March 18, 1993).

Section 31-297(b) does not preclude an employer from contesting extent of disability. Claimant filed a notice of claim August 16, 1990 for injuries sustained January 23, 1990. Respondent accepted initial liability, however, their disclaimer although filed late, disputed extent of disability and not compensability. Therefore, CRB affirmed trier’s denial of claimant’s Motion to Preclude.

Kari v. Wallingford, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 25, 1242 CRD-8-91-6 (February 23, 1993).

Disclaimer in response to notice alleging emotional disorder, physical and mental stress, anxiety and depression, found sufficiently specific to avoid statutory presumption of liability.

Borent v. State/Dept. of Transportation, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 219, 1302 CRD-2-91-9 (December 17, 1992), aff’d, 33 Conn. App. 495 (1994).

CRB reversed trier’s ruling denying claimant’s motion to preclude as claimant’s notice of claim for hearing loss was filed within one year from the last day worked. CRB relied on previous decisions that hearing loss results from repetitive trauma and the date of injury is the last day of exposure. Medical treatment received prior to last day worked does not start the clock running for statute of limitation purposes in repetitive trauma claims.

Pickard v. Manchester Gardens Condominium Association, Inc., 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 216, 1331 CRD-1-91-9 (December 17, 1992).

CRB affirmed trier’s finding claimant’s notice of claim failed to comply with technical requirements of § 31-294. Claimant failed to sufficiently establish a date of injury for his alleged back trauma claimed as work related, although CRB noted that, ordinarily, a trial commissioner need not inquire beyond the face of the documents submitted on a Motion to Preclude.

Halliday v. Daw’s Critical Care Registry, Inc., 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 187, 1196 CRD-7-91-3 (September 14, 1992), dismissed lack of final judgment, A.C. 11770 (January 7, 1993), cert. denied, 225 Conn. 905 (February 18, 1993).

Remanded. CRB held it was not improper for trial commissioner to grant preclusion without an evidentiary hearing once jurisdiction was no longer an issue. However, record below fails to disclose whether claimant actually filed a Motion to Preclude in accordance with Adm. Reg. § 31-297(b)-1. Therefore, trier’s granting of said Motion violated respondent’s due process right to oppose such Motion by filing opposing affidavits, further documentation and memoranda of law. See also, Halliday, § 31-275(9).

Wald v. Hitchcock Chair Co., 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 192, 1281 CRD-5-91-8 (September 14, 1992).

Language in notice does not require a medical diagnosis nor does claimant need to prove compensability. See, Shira v. National Business Systems, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 140, 840 CRD-6-89-4 (August 16, 1990).

Chute v. Mobil Shipping and Transportation, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 183, 1321 CRD-7-91-10 (September 1, 1992), aff’d, 32 Conn. App. 16 (1993), cert. denied, 227 Conn. 919 (1993).

CRB held Pereira v. State, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 9 (January 8, 1991) directly on point. Notice of claim failed to identify employer as State of Connecticut, Department of Motor Vehicles. See, Chase, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 292, 2185 CRB-2-94-9 (June 20, 1996), in notes on § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Chase v. State/Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 181, 1305 CRD-2-91-9 (September 1, 1992), rev’d, 45 Conn. App. 499 (1997).

Motion to Preclude denied where trier found no employer/employee relationship existed as decedent was an independent contractor. See also, Chute, § 31-275(9) and § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Crochiere v. Enfield/Board of Education, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 165, 1069 CRD-1-90-7 (August 27, 1992), aff’d, 227 Conn. 333 (1993).

In repetitive trauma cases the last day worked is the last day of exposure. The last day of claimant’s exposure to the work related mentally traumatizing events was October 21, 1987, the last day worked. Notice of claim was filed September 22, 1988. Clearly, a repetitive trauma claim was timely filed. For occupational disease cases, the time of injury is the date of total or partial incapacity to work. A three-year limit is set by statute for filing a claim for occupational disease. Claimant’s psychotic breakdown for which he was hospitalized occurred December 25, 1987. Therefore, the first day of disability, December 25, 1987, and a September 22, 1988 notice clearly fall within § 31-294’s occupational disease limits. See also, Crochiere, § 31-275(1), § 31-284(a), § 31-298, § 31-301. Factual findings and Appeal procedure.

Campbell v. Manchester Memorial, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 151, 1182 CRD-5-91-2 (June 30, 1992).

Remanded as trier made no factual finding as to when claimant knew or should have known that her right shoulder disability (i.e. repetitive trauma injury) was causally related to work. See, Edmounds v. Machlett Laboratories, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 241, 1119 CRD-7-90- 10 (October 31, 1991). See also, Campbell, § 31-301. Appeal procedure. Subsequent decision at Campbell, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 157, 1754 CRB-1-93-6 (March 8, 1995), supra.

Prisco v. North & Judd, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 154, 1190 CRD-8-91-3 (June 30, 1992).

Occupational disease claim timely filed. Respondents failed to set out the specific parts of the evidentiary record which support their claim that claimant should have known in 1984 and possibly as early as 1981 that his symptoms were occupationally related. See also, Prisco, § 31-275(1).

McGowan v. Robin Michaels Beauty Center, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 121, 1246 CRD-3-91-6 (May 15, 1992).

Notice of claim complied with technical requirements of § 31-294. CRB affirmed trier’s finding that Robyn Michaels Beauty Center is an entity against whom liability may attach and was claimant’s employer despite the fact that no trade name certificate had been filed.

Rodriguez v. Bruce Manufacturing, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 118, 1268 CRD-6-91-7 (May 15, 1992), dismissed for lack of final judgment, 30 Conn. App. 320 (1993).

CRB unpersuaded by respondents’ argument that claimant’s notice fails to state in simple language but rather provides too much information and that the notice of claim was merely a request for information.

Paccadolmi v. Newtown, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 116, 1270 CRD-4-91-8 (May 13, 1992).

CRB affirmed trier’s finding claimant knew or should have known he had heart disease as early as 1985 when medical treatment was rendered. Claim filed in 1989 does not meet § 31-294’s statutory limitations. See also, Paccadolmi, § 7-433c.

Polleto v. New Milford Septic, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 105, 1174 CRD-7-91-2 (May 6, 1992).

Disclaimer sent to address listed on claimant’s driver’s license properly filed as claimant’s address, i.e., a P.O. Box, is the equivalent of his residence. CRB affirmed trier’s finding disclaimer was timely filed and sufficiently specific.

Murach v. New Britain, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 89, 1172 CRD-6-91-2 (April 20, 1992).

CRB reversed trier’s finding awarding claimant § 7-433c benefits. Trier found 1988 notice of claim timely as hypertension was controlled by medication from 1978 through claimant’s first manifestation of a symptom, an aortic aneurysm in 1988. CRB found first manifestation was in 1978 as claimant’s condition was then disabling as claimant required medication to continue to work. Therefore, notice in 1988 was untimely filed. See also, Murach, § 7-433c, § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.

Romeo v. H & L Chevrolet, Inc., 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 72, 1149 CRD-7-90-12 (March 31, 1992).

CRB affirmed trier’s decision dismissing claimant’s claim where claimant failed to prove notice was given within one year of the injury as district had no record of such notice being filed. See also, Romeo, § 31-278 and § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Vachon v. General Dynamics Corporation/Electric Boat Division, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 53, 1137 CRD-2-90-11 (February 19, 1992), rev’d, 29 Conn. App. 654 (1992), cert. denied, 224 Conn. 927 (1993).

CRB held as respondent failed to serve disclaimer on the claimant within twenty days upon receipt of claimant’s notice of claim, motion to preclude granted. Public Act 90-116, § 9, which requires notices of claim contain a warning provision as to the preclusive effects of § 31-297(b), affects a substantive right and should not be applied retroactively. Appellate Court reversed and remanded. Appellate Court held employer not required to send notice to employee within 20 days as § 31-297(b) does not contain language specifically directing the sending of a disclaimer notice to employee within 20 days.

Yankus v. Post College, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 56, 1159 CRD-5-91-1 (February 19, 1992).

Reversed trier’s ruling granting claimant’s motion to preclude as disclaimer filed timely, properly addressed to the trial commissioner and sent to the chairman’s office was properly served. At the time the disclaimer was filed the trial commissioner was a commissioner at large assigned to the chairman’s office. Also, § 31-280 as it existed gave the chairman statewide jurisdiction.

Peters v. State/Southern Connecticut State University, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 32, 1103 CRD-3-90-8 (January 13, 1992).

Whether a claim is timely filed is a jurisdictional question which can be raised at any time. See, Pelletier v. Caron Pipe Jacking, Inc., 13 Conn. App. 276 (1988). Evidence supports trier’s conclusion statute began to run when claimant became aware of the possible link between his work place and his cancer. Therefore notice satisfies jurisdictional and technical prerequisites for an occupational disease notice of claim. Additionally, as respondents previously withdrew their appeal in an earlier decision granting claimant’s Motion to Preclude, contention as to whether notice met all the technical requirements of § 31-294 was waived. See also, Peters, Remanded on § 31-308(c) issue, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Black v. London & Egazarian, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 25, 1098 CRD-7-90-8 (December 30, 1991), rev’d, 30 Conn. App. 295 (1993), cert. denied, 225 Conn. 916 (1993).

CRD affirmed trier’s finding dependent widow failed to sustain her burden of proof that decedent’s cardiac arrest and death arose in and out of the course of his employment as factual finding was based on the weight and credibility he gave to the evidence and medical testimony presented. Appellate Court found commissioner improperly denied Motion to Preclude, thereby reversing CRD’s ruling. Appellate Court found claimant’s notice complied with § 31-321 in that the notice was in fact properly deposited as certified mail. Postal worker’s unsuccessful attempt to obtain a signed receipt does not constitute non-compliance. Also, claimant’s letter included all the information necessary under § 31-294 to satisfy notice requirements. Furthermore, intend to file language in claimant’s letter apprised employer of an imminent claim under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Prior decision at Black, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 126, 483 CRD-7-86 (June 29, 2988), infra.

DeAlmeida v. M.C.M. Stamping Corporation, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 21, 1097 CRD-7-90-8, 1139 CRD-7-90-11 (December 30, 1991), aff’d, 29 Conn. App. 441 (1992).

Public Act 90-116 provided notices of claim must be properly served and include a warning to the employer they shall be precluded from contesting liability unless a notice contesting liability is filed within the time prescribed. Respondent’s contention P.A. 90-116 should be applied retroactively is erroneous as P.A. 90-116 affects substantive rights. Further, issues of causation are not jurisdictional and cannot be raised if respondent is precluded from asserting defenses to a claim pursuant to § 31-297b. See, Marchesseault v. Guerrera, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 104, 850 CRD-5-89-4 (November 9, 1989).

Carvalko v. Bassick Company, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 258, 767 CRD-4-88-9 (December 2, 1991).

CRD affirmed trial commissioner’s finding that claimant’s date of injury for hearing loss claim was the last date of exposure to the noisy environment. Further, where notice of claim set out specific period of time for which hearing loss was attributed and evidence during proceedings below indicates exposure at a different period, and trial commissioner finds that subsequent period to be the date of injury, statute of non-claim satisfied. Notice was filed within one year from the date of injury, i.e. date of last exposure. See also, Carvalko, § 31-301. Factual findings.

Mingrone v. Burndy Corporation, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 252, 1109 CRD-7-90-9 (November 21, 1991).

Remanded as CRD disagreed with trier’s interpretation of § 31-294 concerning statute of limitations for occupational disease and surviving widow’s claim for compensation. A possibility or mere suspicion does not satisfy statutory intent when a symptom should plainly appear. CRD also found surviving widow’s notice of claim for compensation met all the statutory requirements under § 31-294. Trier erred in concluding notice was insufficient. CRD found notice did in fact state surviving widow’s name (Mrs. Bruno Mingrone), her address, identified her claim properly and reason why a claim was being filed. Place of accident as used in § 31-294 does not pertain to occupational disease notice requirements. No need to include address of deceased person.

Edmounds v. Machlett Laboratories, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 241, 1119 CRD-7-90-10 (October 31, 1991).

Remanded as CRD unable to determine on what legal basis the trier concluded that § 31-294’s exception to a written notice of claim was not satisfied. Here claimant suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome. It is not clear when the claimant knew or should have known of the disabling condition. CRD opinion also discussed § 31-294’s provision of furnishing medical care as interpreted by case law.

Collins v. Jiffy Auto Radiator, Inc., 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 232, 993 CRD-3-90-3 (October 30, 1991).

Medical bills paid by group health insurance does not constitute furnishing of medical care. See, Clapps v. Waterbury Iron Works, Inc., 38 Conn. Sup. 644 (1983).

Tomkus v. Upjohn Company, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 163, 972 CRD-3-90-1 (June 28, 1991).

Where company nurse performs an EKG and subsequently drives claimant to the hospital the statutory requirements of furnishing medical care are met. See also, Tomkus, § 31-301. Factual findings and § 31-298.

Dubois v General Dynamics Corporation/Electric Boat Division, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 160, 1095 CRD-2-90-8 (June 25, 1991), aff’d, 222 Conn. 62 (1992).

Notice of claim under § 31-294 does not require address of deceased employee where name and address of the person in whose interest compensation is claimed appears on the notice. Also, statutory language of § 31-297(b) makes it clear that the twenty day window for filing a disclaimer begins when the employer receives the notice of claim not when the commissioner receives the notice of claim.

Lorusso v. State/Southbury Training School, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 158, 1059 CRD-5-90-6 (June 13, 1991).

CRD affirmed trier’s denial of claimant’s Motion to Preclude as disclaimer contained even more specificity than that in Tovish v. Gerber Electronics, 19 Conn. App. 273 (1989).

Greger v. State/Southbury Training School, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 156, 1016 CRD-5-90-5 (June 10, 1991).

CRD affirmed trier’s denial of claimant’s Motion to Preclude as disclaimer was sufficiently specific under Tovish v. Gerber Electronics, 19 Conn. App. 273 (1989).

Marchesseault v. J.P. Guerrera, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 133, 982 CRD-5-90-2 (May 22, 1991).

CRD affirmed trier’s ruling denying claimant’s Motion to Preclude as disclaimer language was sufficiently specific under Tovish v. Gerber Electronics, 19 Conn. App. 273 (1989).

Deangelo v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 126, 970 CRD-8-90-1 (May 16, 1991).

Statute of limitations as to occupational disease begins to run from the first manifestation of symptoms which plainly appear, not when suspected or doubtful.

Melvin v. Mattatuck Manufacturing Co., 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 131, 964 CRD-5-89-12 (May 16, 1991).

CRD reversed trier’s ruling granting claimant’s Motion to Preclude as disclaimer language was sufficiently specific under Tovish v. Gerber Electronics, 19 Conn. App. 273 (1989).

Synnott v. Waterbury, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 129, 962 CRD-5-89-12 (May 16, 1991).

CRD affirmed trier’s ruling denying claimant’s Motion to Preclude as disclaimer was sufficiently specific under Tovish v. Gerber Electronics, 19 Conn. App. 273 (1989).

Dattillo v. Yale University, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 118, 1074 CRD-3-90-7 (April 26, 1991).

CRD held notice of claim met statutory requirements of § 31-294. Employer failed to serve disclaimer in accordance with § 31-321, therefore any objections to causation are irrelevant and preclusion must lie.

Hushin v. Hawthorne Inn, Inc., 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 98, 931 CRD-6-89-10 (March 5, 1991).

CRD remanded matter as trier’s conclusion that respondents mailing of a disclaimer to claimant’s attorney’s address published in a then current telephone directory therefore satisfying § 31-321 was not supported by the evidence in the record below.

Colas v. Marriott Food Services, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 86, 939 CRD-7-89-11 (February 26, 1991).

Trier’s failure to admit document into evidence or take administrative notice of it would not have affected the result of the decision. One respondent sought to admit a letter (notice of claim) from claimant’s counsel in order to support a Motion to Preclude. CRD held that while the letter which purported alternative theories for the basis of the compensation claim was sufficient notice under § 31-294, the letter would not support the preclusive effects of § 31-297(b) as it was not a direct assertion of a claim against the other respondents. See also, Colas, § 31-298, and § 31-307b.

Baldoni v. St. Mary’s Hospital, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 43, 916 CRD-5-89-9 (February 1, 1991).

Where two timely disclaimers are filed and trier fails to consider one disclaimer which satisfies the specificity requirements of § 31-297(b) as held in Tovish v. Gerber Electronics, 19 Conn. App. 273 (1989), trier’s decision reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Pereira v. State/Dept. Children & Youth Services, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 9, 906 CRD-7-89-8 (January 8, 1991), dismissed for lack of final judgment, A.C. 9884 (March 20, 1991).

Notice failed to properly identify employer for § 31-297(b) purposes when employer was designated as Dept. Children & Youth Services and no reference was made to State of Connecticut. But see, Pereira, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 229, 1209 CRD-7-91-4 (1993), aff’d, 228 Conn. 535 (1994), § 31-275(1) and § 31-301. Factual findings. Supreme Court noted that CRB’s strict compliance with notice requirements was inappropriate. See, Pereira, supra at 542-43, note 8.

Hveem v. State, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 5, 897 CRD-5-89-7 (January 4, 1991).

Reversed decision of trial commissioner. Disclaimer language sufficiently specific. See, Tovish v. Gerber Electronics, 19 Conn. App. 273 (1989). See, Hveem, § 31-321.

DiBenedetto v. State/University of Connecticut Health Center, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 1, 862 CRD-6-89-5 (January 3, 1991).

Remanded to establish compensability as proper disclaimer filed before proper notice of claim does not render it deficient. See, Gelinas v. St. Mary’s Hospital, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 65, 705 CRD-5-88-3 (August 16, 1989); Lopez v. Peerless Aluminum Foundry, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 46, 654 CRD-4-87 (October 18, 1988); Elmassri v. Vinco, Inc., 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 96, 584 CRD-7-87 (June 2, 1988); Skorupski v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 133, 338 CRD-3-84 (April 1, 1985). See also, DiBenedetto, § 5-142(a), § 5-145a.

Rogers v. General Dynamics Corporation/Electric Boat Division, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 163, 878 CRD-2-89-6 (September 27, 1990).

Proper disclaimer filed before written notice of claim satisfies § 31-297(b) requirements. See, Elmassri v. Vinco, Inc., 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 96, 584 CRD-7-87 (June 2, 1988); Lopez v. Peerless Aluminum Foundry, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 46, 654 CRD-4-87 (October 18, 1988).

Shira v. National Business Systems, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 140, 840 CRD-6-89-4 (August 16, 1990), remanded, lack of final judgment, 25 Conn. App. 350 (1991).

Notice of claim need only state the nature of injury in simple language. The only defenses which survive an elapsed disclaimer are jurisdictional ones. If they are satisfied, preclusion must lie.

Orcutt v. Ohmweave Co., 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 125, 822 CRD-2-89-2 (August 2, 1990).

Law which governs is the law at the time of the injury. For occupational disease the time of injury is the date of first known manifestation. See also, Orcutt, § 31-307.

Fleming v. New Haven Register, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 108, 827 CRD-5-89-2 (June 19, 1990).

Remanded where trial commissioner failed to state specific reasons for denying preclusion.

Dorsett v. General Dynamics Corporation/Electric Boat Division, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 77, 805 CRD-2-88-12 (May 8, 1990), aff’d, 23 Conn. App. 827 (1990)(per curiam), cert. denied, 218 Conn. 901 (1991).

Statute does not require address of deceased employee. Address of dependent widow claiming benefits pursuant to § 31-306 sufficient to satisfy notice requirements. Notice filed within limitation period, therefore complied with jurisdictional prerequisite.

Trantolo v. Trantolo & Trantolo, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 69, 823 CRD-6-89-2 (April 17, 1990).

Respondent’s attack on constitutionality of § 31-297(b) requirement that disclaimer be filed within 20 days could not be decided by commission as it lacks jurisdiction over such issues. See also, Trantolo, § 31-300, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Deck v. Groton, 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 1, 745 CRD-2-88-6 (December 12, 1989).

Motion to Preclude denied where notice of claim for heart attack failed to meet one year statute of limitation under § 31-294. Further evidentiary hearings necessary to determine if claimant’s § 7-433c claim for hypertension met 3 year statute of limitation for occupational disease.

Delos v. United Illuminating, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 111, 751 CRD-4-88-7 (November 30, 1989).

For hearing loss, the date of injury is last date of exposure to repetitive trauma.

Marchesseault v. Guerrera, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 104, 850 CRD-5-89-4 (November 9, 1989).

Remanded. Commissioner’s jurisdictional analysis as to the applicability of § 31-297(b) was incorrect. Employer-employee relationship existed at the time of injury, however, whether injury arose out of or during the course of employment requires a separate determination.

Cousins v. Hartford, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 101, 676 CRD-1-87 (November 8, 1989).

Employer’s treatment of claimant’s nosebleed, eye infection and thrombosis of the retinal blood vessels was not the furnishing of medical care sufficient to toll statute of limitations where claimed disability was for heart and hypertension. See also, Cousins, § 7-433c.

Guinan v. Direct Marketing Association, Inc., 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 93, 734 CRD-7-88-5 (October 4, 1989), dismissed for lack of final judgment, 21 Conn. App. 63 (1990), appeal reinstated, 22 Conn. App. 515 (1990), aff’d, 23 Conn. App. 804 (1990)(per curiam).

Due process does not require notice of claim inform respondents as to possible preclusion of defenses under § 31-297(b). If notice provides an address where mail or other communications will be received, that address is sufficient. See also, Robinson v. Miller, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 69, 686 CRD-1-88-1 (August 28, 1989). Note: See, P.A. 90-116.

Velez v. Richard Zappone, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 79, 693 CRD-5-88-2 (September 14, 1989), no error, 21 Conn. App. 812 (1990)(per curiam).

Motion to preclude cannot lie where Commission lacked jurisdiction over the res as there was no employment relationship. See, Castro v. Viera, 207 Conn. 420 (1988). See also, Velez, § 31-275(9).

Paul v. Perkin Elmer Corp., 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 75, 684 CRD-7-88-1 (September 5, 1989).

Notice was sufficient under § 31-294 for the claim to survive the statute of limitations, however, such notice would not satisfy 31-297(b) requirements under DeLeon v. Jacob Bros., 38 Conn. Sup. 331 (1981); Secor v. C.A. Parshall, Inc., 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 158 (March 8, 1988); Brown v. Bonvini Dental Lab, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 132, 594 CRD-7-87 (March 28, 1989); Salvaggio v. Candlewood Valley Bus Co., 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 156, 731 CRD-7-88 (May 1, 1989). Claim dismissed on alternate ground failure to sustain burden of proof where evidence of causality insufficient.

Robinson v. Miller, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 69, 686 CRD-1-88-1 (August 28, 1989).

Reversed & remanded, where notice of claim designates a place where mail or other communications could reach claimant (in the hospital) and additionally gave the address of claimant’s lawyer, the requirements of § 31-294 have been satisfied.

Lopez v. Penny’s Restaurant, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 67, 697 CRD-7-88-2 (August 23, 1989).

Remanded. Where letter from employer sent regular mail raises jurisdictional issue as to employment status, late or improperly filed disclaimer will estop § 31-297(b) presumption.

Gelinas v. St. Mary’s Hospital, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 65, 705 CRD-88-3 (August 16, 1989).

Remanded. Notice contains all elements necessary to comply with § 31-294 requirements. Place of injury and place of employment are the same in this instance. Notice satisfies simple language requirement. Disclaimer filed early does not render it deficient. However, disclaimer did not comply with § 31-321, therefore preclusion must lie.

Durante v. Amity Regional School District #5, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 59, 701 CRD-3-88-3 (August 11, 1989).

Disclaimer not sufficiently specific where language constitutes a general denial.

Cleveland v. U.S. Printing Ink, Inc., 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 51, 680 CRD-2-88-1 (August 10, 1989), no error, 21 Conn. App. 610 (1990), aff’d, 218 Conn. 181 (1991).

Allegation of improper venue incorrect as § 31-278 and § 31-294 permit notice and jurisdiction of claims with any commissioner. Where trial commissioner finds employer-employee relationship exists and there were significant contacts with this jurisdiction, Motion to Preclude will lie. See also, Cleveland, § 31-278.

Garthwait v. Banner State Rail, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 24, 605 CRD-3-87 (July 12, 1989).

Remanded. Failure to properly identify employer and employer’s address renders notice insufficient to meet technical requirements of § 31-294.

Wagner v. Texaco Refining & Marketing, Inc., 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 14, 637 CRD-1-87 (June 23, 1989).

Motion to Preclude upheld on the basis that notice of claim was proper and timely filed within the three-year limit for an occupational disease.

Salvaggio v. Candlewood Valley Bus Co., 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 156, 731 CRD-7-88-5 (May 1, 1989).

Notice of claim which stated employer’s name incorrectly is insufficient to preclude liability. See also, Fuller v. Central Paving Co., 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 92, 655 CRD-1-87 (April 6, 1988).

Ebrech v. Cadbury Schweppes, Inc., 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 120, 687 CRD-7-88-1 (March 2, 1989).

Section 31-294 only requires statement of claim and nature of injury in simple language. See also, Pagan v. Paparazzo & Son, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 38 (September 30, 1988). Disclaimer sent by ordinary mail to compensation commissioner not in compliance with § 31-321, See, Skorupski v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 133, 338 CRD-3-84 (April 1, 1985); Ricci v. Peabody N.E. Inc., 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 54, 738 CRD-3-88-6 (October 26, 1988).

Piscitelli v. Connecticut Coke/Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 94, 575 CRD-3-87 (January 26, 1989).

Statute of Limitations for occupational disease runs from date of first known manifestation.

Collins v. Seal Products, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 90, 702 CRD-5-88-3 (January 19, 1989).

Disclaimer not sufficiently specific.

Falcigno v. Joseph Feldman, Inc., 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 88, 733 CRD-3-88-5 (January 13, 1989).

Remanded as trial commissioner did not take evidence as to jurisdictional defenses. See also, Falcigno, § 31-278. See, Castro v. Viera, 207 Conn. 420 (1988).

Schenkel v. Ken Yoos Valley Services, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 78 (January 6, 1989).

Remanded to establish jurisdictional facts as to the timeliness of the claim.

Ricci v. Peabody N.E., Inc., 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 54, 738 CRD-3-88-6 (October 26, 1988).

Disclaimer sent regular mail to commissioner’s office invalid.

Lopez v. Peerless Aluminum Foundry, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 46, 654 CRD-4-87 (October 18, 1988).

A motion to preclude will not lie where a valid notice of disclaimer [Form 43] was filed prior to a notice of claim.

Pagan v. Paparazzo’s & Son, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 38, 653 CRD-5-87 (September 30, 1988).

Section 31-294’s requirement as to statement of nature of injury does not require a medical diagnosis.

Barron v. East Hartford, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 15, 534 CRD-1-86 (September 13, 1988).

Medical care provided to claimant by respondent-Town’s Director of Health who was also a physician constituted furnishing of medical care.

Grady v. G & L Oxygen & Medical Co., 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 12, 572 CRD-6-87 (September 12, 1988).

Where claimant alleges injury due to repetitive trauma, § 31-294 requirement of specific accident dates not applicable. Further, in order for claim to meet statute of limitations repetitive trauma must have existed 1 year prior to claim filing.

Jarret v. Clairol, Inc., 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 5, 540 CRD-7-86 (August 16, 1988).

Trial commissioner must rule on jurisdictional issues before further action on a motion to preclude.

Tovish v. Gerber Electronics, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 154, 617 CRD-4-87 (August 2, 1988), remanded, 19 Conn. App. 273 (1989), cert. denied, 212 Conn. 814 (1989).

Disclaimer language, “Injury did not arise out of or in the course and scope of employment,” held not sufficiently specific. See later case, Tovish, § 31-275(1).

Gallagher v. Edmunds Manufacturing Co., 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 133, 494 CRD-6-86 (June 30, 1988).

The recitation of specific disabling conditions in a Voluntary Agreement does not preclude a claimant from asserting disabilities other than those specifically cited in the Voluntary Agreement if the injuries were causally related.

Black v. London & Egazarian Associates, Inc., 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 126, 483 CRD-7-86 (June 29, 1988), rev’d, 30 Conn. App. 295 (1993), cert. denied, 225 Conn. 916 (1993).

Trial commissioner’s conclusion that claimant’s notice was not filed in conformity with § 31-321 was not based on impermissible inferences or contrary to law. Further rulings on Motions to Preclude are permitted under § 31-301(a). Subsequent decision at Black, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 25, 1098 CRD-7-90-8 (December 30, 1991), supra.

Chute v. Mobil Shipping and Transportation Co., 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 119, 579 CRD-7-87 (June 21, 1988).

Claimant’s notice of claim failed to properly identify claimant and therefore did not contain all elements necessary under § 31-294. Held no § 31-297 (b) preclusion could lie. Subsequent decision at Chute, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 183, 1321 CRD-7-91-10 (September 1, 1992), aff’d, 32 Conn. App. 16 (1993), cert. denied, 227 Conn. 919 (1993), § 31-275(9), § 31-294c, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.

Elmassri v. Vinco, Inc., 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 96, 584 CRD-7-87 (June 2, 1988).

See, Fuller, infra. Also a perfect disclaimer of liability filed before a notice of claim is a proper disclaimer and therefore the preclusive effects of § 31-297(b) cannot lie.

Paladino v. Schaller Subaru, Inc., 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 87, 522 CRD-6-86 (May 17, 1988).

Respondents’ failure to send its disclaimer within statutory period and as directed by § 31-321 rendered the disclaimer a nullity. The respondents’ attempt to cure the defective filing after the 20-day statutory period for filing was untimely and therefore, Motion to Preclude granted.

Lumley v. Fairfield, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 77, 439 CRD-4-85 (May 10, 1988).

See, Pelletier, infra.

Foley v. New Britain, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 68, 404 CRD-7-85, Gavin v. New Britain, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 68, 405 CRD-7-85 (April 28, 1988), no error, 17 Conn. App. 834 (1989) (per curiam).

The furnishing of medical care does not trigger need for a disclaimer.

Kalaky v. State, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 66, 520 CRD-4-86 (April 28, 1988).

Sinaguglia v. Stamford, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 62, 435 CRD-7-85 (April 26, 1988).

Claim for job-related stress benefits time barred under § 31-294 where the first manifestation of symptom was found to be in 1978 and the notice of claim was in 1982.

Wilcox v. Naugatuck, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 54, 518 CRD-5-86 (April 8, 1988), no error, 16 Conn. App. 676 (1988)(per curiam).

Language of disclaimer lacked specificity required under Menzies, infra. See also, Tovish, supra.

Notice of claim must meet all technical requirements of § 31-294 before the preclusive effects of § 31-297 (b) will be triggered. Substantial compliance is not enough to trigger § 31-297(b).

Gardella v. The Torrington Co., 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 33, 471 CRD-5-86 (April 6, 1988).

Preclusion does not apply to issue of extent of disability.

Kelly v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 38, 469 CRD-4-86 (April 6, 1988).

Disclaimer not served in accordance with § 31-297(b) and § 31-321 failed to satisfy requisites of statute.

Pagliuco v. United Illuminating, 5 Conn. Worker’s Comp. Rev. Op. 27, 427 CRD-4-85 (March 29, 1988).

Medical care furnished to claimant by a registered nurse employed in employer’s health department and under the supervision of a physician was held to meet exception to requirement of written notice of claim.

Bjelka v. Norwalk Hospital, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 21, 370 CRD-7-84 (March 28, 1988).

Trial commissioner’s reliance on C.G.S. § 7442 (Rev. 1949) may be misplaced where later evidence was found tending to show claimant’s first exposure to deleterious substance was not during employment with respondents. CRD remanded as the date of death and first manifestation of symptom were November 1977 and March 1978 (respectively) and thus, § 31-297(b) preclusion might lie.

Maher v. State, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 19, 374 CRD-4-85 (March 24, 1988).

Trial commissioner’s finding that notice was sent by certified mail will not be disturbed on appeal. See also, Maher, § 31-306.

Pich v. Pratt & Whitney, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 163, 354 CRD-6-84 (March 9, 1988).

Informal hearing met statute’s hearing exception for written notice and date of injury for hearing loss was last day worked.

Morton v. Vallerie’s Transportation, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 161, 343 CRD-7-84 (March 9, 1988).

Calling for an ambulance when worker complained of internal pain was not furnishing of medical care where pain was not readily distinguishable as symptom of a work injury. Further, payment of medical expenses through union administered group insurance plan was not furnishing of medical care.

Secor v. C.A. Parshall, Inc., 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 158, 340 CRD-7-84 (March 8, 1988).

A notice of claim for § 31-294 purposes need not be served in accordance with § 31-321. Cf. § 31-297(b).

Butkus v. Bethlehem, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 153, 421 CRD-5-85 (February 23, 1988).

Notice of Intent to Contest must be sent certified or registered mail as provided in § 31-321.

Laprade v. Robbins, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 100, 505 CRD-7-87 (June 12, 1987).

Respondent argued that it should not be precluded from contesting liability where it alleged fraud in the making of the claim. Held commissioner’s factual determination that there was no fraud in the making of the claim should be upheld.

Bull v. Raymark Industries, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 91, 474 CRD-4-86 (June 8, 1987).

Disclaimer stating grounds of contest as alleged injury found lacking specificity.

Castro v. Viera, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 64, 442 CRD-1-86 (1987), error, 207 Conn. 420 (1987).

CRD held respondent could not assert defense of no employer-employee relationship when it failed to file a timely disclaimer. Reversed by Supreme Court.

Squier v. Raymark Industries, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 46, 406 CRD-4-85 (April 3, 1987).

Use of the term “alleged” before “injury” on Form 43 did not meet Menzies v. Fisher, 165 Conn. 338 (1973) specificity requirements.

Janov v. General Electric Co., 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 44, 491 CRD-4-86 (March 27, 1987).

A recurrence of injury relates back to the date of original injury and therefore does not time bar claim.

Ash v. New Milford, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 41, 433 CRD-7-85(a), 433 CRD-7-85(b) (March 26, 1987), no error, 207 Conn. 665 (1988).

Non-compliance with 20-day disclaimer rule precludes right to assert defenses against both dependent widow and dependent minor son. Also flooding of municipality which did not actually close municipal government office did not excuse Town from compliance with 20-day period.

Boutin v. Industrial Components, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 19, 237 CRD-6-83 (March 3, 1987).

Repetitive trauma statute of limitation starts to run from when claimant knew of disability and its work connection. But see Dorsey, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 447, 2268 CRB-7-95-1 (September 6, 1996) and Discuillo v. Stone & Webster, 242 Conn. 570 (1997), supra.

Barnett v. Stafford, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 7, 219 CRD-1-83 (March 2, 1987).

Disclaimer held sufficiently specific under Menzies v. Fisher, 165 Conn. 338 (1973).

Pelletier v. Caron Pipe Jacking, Inc., 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 132, 487 CRD-6-86 (December 29, 1986), rev’d, 13 Conn. App. 276 (1988), cert. denied, 207 Conn. 805 (1988).

Employer’s failure to file disclaimer (Form 43) within prescribed time stated in § 31-297(b) results in preclusion. Reversed and set aside by Appellate Court.

Vallee v. Curtis Packaging Company, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 124, 336 CRD-4-84 (December 23, 1986).

Failure to file a written notice of claim within statutory period prescribed by § 31-294 does not prevent preclusion of compensability if employer fails to file a timely Form 43, Notice of Contest, once employee files a written claim.

Oliver v. General Dynamics Corporation/Electric Boat Division, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 117, 225 CRD-2-83 (December 23, 1986).

Exception to written claim requirement where claimant has requested a hearing applies to both formal and informal hearing requests. Furnishing medical attention is an exception to filing written notice of claim within 1 year.

Weston v. Avco Lycoming, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 99, 279 CRD-4-83 (November 26, 1986).

Motion to Preclude granted when Notice of Contest not filed within prescribed time period. See, Bush and LaVogue, infra.

Murphy v. West Haven, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 88, 126 CRD-3-82 (November 13, 1986).

Failure to negate existence of medical care exception will justify refusal to reopen award on ground that no notice was given by claimant within 1 year.

O’Neill v. New King, Inc., 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 86, 190 CRD-6-82 (November 13, 1986).

As notice to the respondent was not forwarded in prescribed statutory manner, claimant’s Motion to Preclude must be denied.

Brusca v. Color Tech, Inc., 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 81, 50 CRD-7-81 (November 6, 1986).

Notice of claim must comply with § 31-321 before Motion to Preclude will be granted.

Sartirana v. Winchester, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 67, 368 CRD-5-84 (July 15, 1986).

Defenses limited to those raised in Notice to Compensation Commissioner and Employee of Intention to Contest Liability to Pay Compensation (Form 43).

Stasolla v. Fairfield, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 63, 328 CRD-4-84 (July 15, 1986).

Defense of untimely filing of claim notice precluded when employer failed to file a timely Notice to Contest Liability (Form 43).

LaVogue v. Cincinnati, Inc., 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 51, 263 CRD-1-83 (April 15, 1986), no error, 9 Conn. App. 91 (1986)(per curiam), cert. denied, 201 Conn. 814 (1986).

Failure to file timely Notice of Contest (Form 43) precludes employer from asserting jurisdictional defense.

Yuknat v. State/State Police, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 43, 274 CRD-2-83 (March 19, 1986), no error, 9 Conn. App. 425 (1987)(per curiam).

Where letter and accompanying documents were to serve as written notice of claim and employer did not contest liability within twenty (20) days, compensability is presumed.

Skorupski v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op.133, 338 CRD-3-84 (April 1, 1985).

Filing of proper notice of claim (Form 30-C), in accord with § 31-321 requirements, must be disclaimed within twenty (20) days.

De La Torre v. State, 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 95, 148 CRD-1-82 (August 6, 1984).

Notice to disclaim liability sent to estate of deceased and not dependent minor child does not operate against interests of dependent minor child where proper notice of claim was filed.

Cuccuro v. West Haven, 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 87, 103 CRD-3-81 (July 27, 1984), no error, 6 Conn. App. 265 (1986), cert. denied, 199 Conn. 804 (1986).

Notice requirements may be satisfied by means other than written notice. See, Spragg v. West Haven, 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 89, 125 CRD-3-82, no error, 6 Conn. App. 265 (1986), cert. denied, 199 Conn. 805 (1986) (same issues).

Bush v. Quality Bakers of America, 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 36, 132 CRD-7-82 (October 4, 1983), no error, 2 Conn. App. 363 (1984), cert. denied, 194 Conn. 804 (1984).

Compensation awarded due to employer’s failure to file a timely notice of contest where injury did not arise out of and in the course of employment.

Timothy v. Upjohn, 2 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 1, 150 CRD-3-83 (February 25, 1983), dismissed for lack of final judgment, 3 Conn. App. 162 (1985).

Notice of claim for chapter 568 benefits must be made in accordance with § 31-321 if claimant seeks to preclude respondent from contesting liability.

Janco v. Fairfield, 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 189, 102 CRD-4-81 (September 13, 1982), reversed and remanded, 39 Conn. Sup. 403 (1983).

Compensation Review Division held furnishing group health benefits constituted furnishing medical care. Appellate court reversed and remanded.

Cortes v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 173, 61 CRD-3-81 (August 18, 1982).

Statute of limitation did not commence until claimant knew or should have known that he was experiencing a manifestation of occupational disease symptoms.

Ciotti v. Morani Tile Co., 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 141, 35 CRD-4-80 (July 29, 1982).

No written notice of claim necessary where employer furnished medical care under group plan. Where notice of claim was filed but not necessary, disclaimer of liability must be filed within twenty (20) days.

Graf v. Genovese & Massaro, Inc., 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 129, 59 CRD-3-81 (July 13, 1982).

Claimant furnished care within one year.

Clapps v. Waterbury Iron Work, 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 115, 20 CRD-5-80 (February 19, 1982), error; judgement directed, 38 Conn. Sup. 644 (1983).

Payment of medical expenses by group health plan constituted furnishing of medical care under statute. Appellate court set aside and remanded.

DeLeon v. Jacob Brothers, Inc., 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 18, 23 CRD-4-80 (January 26, 1981), aff’d, 38 Conn. Sup. 331 (1981), appeal dismissed, 456 U.S. 952, 102 S. Ct. 2026 (1982).

CRB Case Annotations re: Section 31-294c

Notice of injury. Preclusion of compensation defenses to liability.