CRB Case Annotations re: Section 31-295

Parties executed Voluntary Agreement in November 2004 using MMI date of November 9, 2000. Claimant did not receive permanency payments until 2005. Claimant asserted he was entitled to interest and penalties due to late payment of permanency award. Trial commissioner found VA deficient as it did not list percentage of disability or number of weeks of compensation due. Medical reports did not establish physician had opined to MMI as of date listed in VA. Parties did not resolve disputed permanency rating until after VA was executed. Trial commissioner denied claimant’s request. CRB upheld trial commissioner. VA was legally deficient and not supported by medical evidence on the record. VA cannot be enforced against respondent when parties have not agreed on material terms. Since parties continued to negotiate, trial commissioner within discretion to deny sanctions sought for undue delay or unreasonable contest. See also, Milewski, § 31-300, § 31-303.

Trial commissioner ordered interest on late payment of permanency pursuant to both § 31-295(c) C.G.S. and § 31-300 C.G.S. CRB remanded, seeking clarification as to which statute constituted basis for award and whether there had been undue delay. On remand, trier found no undue delay and awarded interest pursuant to 31-300 C.G.S. only. Claimant appealed, arguing respondents improperly contested permanency because of apportionment reimbursement concerns and claimant was therefore entitled to mandatory interest pursuant to § 31-295(c) C.G.S. plus interest and attorney’s fees pursuant to § 31-300 C.G.S. CRB upheld award of interest pursuant to § 31-300 C.G.S. noting permanency continued to be litigated after claimant was rated due to complications in claimant’s medical history and a potential statute of non claim defense. CRB also determined that unlike § 31-303 C.G.S, neither § 31-295(c) C.G.S. nor § 31-300 C.G.S. allow for simultaneous payment of interest. CRB upheld trier’s finding of no undue delay on grounds that, in addition to medical record issues, claimant’s availability for litigation was hampered by his ill health and residence out-of-state for part of the year. Trier denied claimant’s Motion to Correct in its entirety. See also, Abrahamson, § 31-300, § 31-301, Factual Findings. § 31-303, § 31-301-4.

Where evidence did not support finding that payment of permanency benefits began within 20 days of maximum medical improvement, CRB remanded for clarification of date of payment and award of interest, if necessary. See Liebel, § 31-294c, § 31-294d, 31-300, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-312; also cited at Liebel, § 31-278, § 31-298, § 31-307.

Trial commissioner should have awarded interest on unpaid permanency award; as per Schenkel v. Richard Chevrolet, Inc., 4639 CRB-8-03-3 (March 12, 2004). See also, Hernandez, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-307, § 31-308(b), § 31-288(c), § 31-294d.

See, Abrahamson, § 31-300.

CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s order of interest for claimant’s multiple permanent partial disabilities under § 31-295 as of the date of IME’s report. Trier found claimant’s treater did not specify which date of injury was attributable to which injury. Trier is entitled to determine which date maximum medical improvement occurred. See also, Maddaloni, § 31-308(b).

Payment of interest for unpaid permanency benefits is mandatory beginning 30 days after maximum medical improvement date. See also, Schenkel, § 294d, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-307, § 31-308(b), § 31-349.

See, Ruffino, § 7-433c.

Claimant was found to be entitled to payment of “permanent partial disability benefits” for sixteen-day period, followed by payment of 20% permanency award to shoulder commencing on date of maximum medical improvement. 10% interest per annum was awarded on all unpaid weeks, while attorney’s fees were denied. Sixteen-day permanent partial disability award was subsequently amended to reflect entitlement to temporary partial disability benefits. CRB agreed with claimant’s contention that interest cannot be awarded without attorney’s fees under § 31-300, but also agreed that trier had not made a finding of undue delay here. While unpaid permanency may be source of interest award under § 31-295(c), correction as to nature of 16-day award was irreconcilable with unaltered 10% interest order. Due to inconsistent findings, case remanded for clarification. See also, Ortiz, § 31-300; § 31-301. Factual findings.

Where claimant injured both legs in compensable incident, and one leg reached maximum medical improvement while the other continued to leave claimant temporarily partially disabled, CRB held that the phrase “member or members” in § 31-295(c) allows the claimant the option of continuing to receive temporary partial disability benefits until maximum improvement for all members has been reached. Any other construction would render the words “or members” meaningless. (Metro, C., DISSENTING): Alternate reading of “member or members” is plausible. More significant guidance is provided by § 31-308(b), which allows permanency to be paid in conjunction with temporary total disability, but not temporary partial. See also, Rayhall, § 31-278, 31-298, § 31-307, 31-308(b).

Respondents contended that claimant was not out of work for more than three days because she was released to full duty on the fourth day following her injury. However, within several weeks, she was treated by a doctor, and the respondent consented to this treatment. That doctor kept her out of work for over a month. Thus, she was disabled more than three days. See also, Vargas, § 31-294d, § 31-300.

Where payment for permanent partial disability is not paid within thirty days following the date of maximum medical improvement, interest should be awarded. See also, Moxon, § 31-310 and § 31-315.

McCurdy v. State, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 22, 887 CRD-4-89-6 (January 10, 1991) aff’d, 26 Conn. App. 466 (1992), rev’d, 227 Conn. 261 (1993).

Claimant must be entitled to receive § 31-308 benefits before time requirements of § 31-295(c) will apply. See also, McCurdy, § 31-306, § 31-308(b).

Piscitelli v. Connecticut Coke/Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates, 6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 94, 575 CRD-3-87 (January 26, 1989).

Incapacity is not to be narrowly defined so as to defeat purpose of compensation.

Birdsell v. Bic Pen, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 17, 201 CRD-3-83 (March 2, 1987), error in part, 16 Conn. App. 437 (1988).

See, Kreidler, infra. Appellate Court reversed.

Kreidler v. Bic Pen, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 15, 200 CRD-3-83 (March 2, 1987), no error, 16 Conn. App. 437 (1988).

CRB Case Annotations re: Section 31-295

Waiting period. When compensation begins.